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#METOO, STATUTORY RAPE LAWS, AND THE PERSISTENCE OF
GENDER STEREOTYPES
Leslie Y. Garfield Tenzer*
INTRODUCTION
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, feminists pushed for reform of statutory rape
laws.1 At that time, states’ laws limited prosecution for sexual intercourse with a
female below a certain age to males. The only victims of statutory rape were female.2
Feminists advocated that legislatures should rewrite gender-specific sexual assault
laws in gender-neutral terms.3 They hoped that formal equality in statutory rapes
laws would lead to the recognition that both males and females have sexual agency
and greater equality in society as a whole.4
In October 2017, a social movement erupted out of the unacceptable exercise
by men of their power over female subordinates.5 The #MeToo movement exposed
*
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1
See CAROLYN COCCA, JAILBAIT: THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES 12 (2004).
2
See id. at 9–10.
3
Jill Filipovic, Rewriting our rape laws in light of Steubenville, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 27,
2013),
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/03/201332711439106890.html
[https://perma.cc/XX67-HZWW] (“Shifts in rape law came with shifts in women’s rights.
Feminist activists pushed for legal reform in the 1970s and 80s, and by the turn of the century
irrelevant evidence was largely barred and definitions of rape were updated to include male
victims, penetration of orifices other than the vagina, weapons other than a penis, rapes
preceded by threat or coercion and rapes that otherwise weren't forcible.”); see Maya T.
Prabhu, Atlanta senator pushes for gender-neutral language in state rape law, ATLANTA J.CONST.
(Jan.
25,
2018),
https://politics.myajc.com/news/state--regional-govt-politics/atlanta-senator-pushes-for-gender-neutral-language-state-rape-law/JLWqKfQbUz3
KJoi7CTrqyM/ [https://perma.cc/G95W-FZF6] (introducing Bill 145 to update “archaic
state law defining who is a victim of rape to represent all survivors and victims of assault”).
4
See Katherine K. Baker & Michelle Oberman, Women’s Sexual Agency and the Law
of Rape in the 21st Century, 69 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 63, 88 (2016).
5
See Christie D’Zurilla, In saying #MeToo, Alyssa Milano pushes awareness campaign
about sexual assault and harassment, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/la-et-entertainment-news-updates-metoo-campaignme-too-alyssa-milano-1508173882-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/F7M3-A86G]. Actress
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the widespread prevalence of sexual harassment, sexual abuse, and sexual violence
that women experience in the workplace. The goal of the #MeToo movement is to
raise awareness of the prevalence of this type of predatory behavior.6 In other words,
the #MeToo movement strives for a workplace in which women and men are equals.
The #MeToo movement’s objective is not dissimilar to the goal of proponents
of gender-neutral statutory rape laws, which seek to have men and women treated
equally. Unfortunately, these two movements have another similarity. Both the
#MeToo movement and the practical enforcement of gender-neutral laws create a
victimology paradigm. Recognizing inequality among genders requires conceding
perceived female frailties. 7
At the present moment, the #MeToo backlash8 has yet to manifest itself in any
concrete legal form. As court cases and other legal actions move forward, #MeToo
Alyssa Milano initiated the #MeToo movement when she tweeted: “If you’ve been sexually
harassed or assaulted write ‘me too’ as a reply to this tweet.” Id. One day after Milano’s
hashtag, Mashable.com reported that over 109,000 people had tweeted the #MeToo
hashtag. See Alison Main, The #MeToo hashtag was used in an enormous number of tweets,
MASHABLE
(Oct.
16,
2017),
https://mashable.com/2017/10/16/me-too-hashtagpopularity/#JGmEcIvfciqc [https://perma.cc/YD5J-QWJU]. Tarana Burke is credited with
starting the MeToo movement. Cristela Guerra, Where did “MeToo” initiative really come
from? Activist Tarana Burke, long before hashtags, THE BOS. GLOBE, (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/2017/10/17/alyssa-milano-credits-activist-taranaburke-with-founding-metoo-movement-years-ago/o2Jv29v6ljObkKPTPB9KGP/story.html
[https://perma.cc/P84Q-MBRZ]. Burke first used the phrase “MeToo” in 2007 as part of her
own efforts to help victims of sexual harassment. Id. Alyssa Milano credited Burke with
originating the use of MeToo as a means of calling attention to sexual abuse. Id.
6
Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of #MeToo: How a hashtag got its power, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/10/themovement-of-metoo/542979/ [https://perma.cc/S77Z-72L2].
7
See Daphne Merkin, Misgivings About #MeToo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2018, at A19; see
also John Bowden, Elaine Chao: Women can’t let harassment hold them back, THE HILL
(Dec 5, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/363359-elaine-chao-adviseswomen-who-experience-sexual-harassment-to-let-it
[https://perma.cc/AX4Z-S29R]
(quoting Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao as saying: “[women] gotta let it go, [b]ecause
otherwise, it’s too corrosive, it’s too negative, and it does you a double injury because it
holds you back.”); Nicole Hemmer, Opinion, The Pre-emptive #MeToo Backlash, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP. (Jan. 16, 2018), https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:
evosqd_ywSAJ:https://www.usnews.com/opinion/thomas-jefferson-street/articles/2018-0116/aziz-ansari-and-the-pre-emptive-metoo-backlash+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&
client=safari [https://perma.cc/BS7D=RLX9] (criticizing those suggesting a backlash
against #MeToo).
8
See, e.g., Rose Troup Buchanan, Here’s What Happens When #MeToo Backlash Is
Weaponized, BUZZFEED (May 31, 2018) https://www.buzzfeed.com/rosebuchanan/foro
coches-la-manada-doxing?utm_term=.uxPO7EyE9#.gq4RxvDvk [https://perma.cc/5JPURWHR] (observing the “toxic online reaction” to those legitimately sharing #MeToo
moments); Bari Weiss, Opinion, Guilty of Not Being a Mind Reader, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2018, at A19 (suggesting that the #MeToo hashtag has been overly used and is
disempowering to women); Jia Tolentino, The Rising Pressure of the #MeToo Backlash, THE
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supporters may expect to encounter some unintended consequences in the quest for
gender equality. In the case of gender-neutral statutory rape laws, the best of feminist
intentions, in fact, have resulted in a retreat to a time when girls were considered
incapable of protecting themselves, at best, and, at the worst, parental property.
Consider the following.
Bill, an eighth-grade boy, and Carol, a seventh-grade girl, engaged in
consensual sex. They had been dating for eighteen months. When Carol’s parents
learned of the encounter, they called the sheriff’s department. Officers arrested Bill
and charged him with a sexual-conduct misdemeanor. Carol faced no charges.9
Under Kentucky’s law, the sheriff’s department could have charged Carol with
the crime, which is a part of the universe of sex crimes defined under the umbrella
of statutory rape. 10 Kentucky removed gender-specificity from its sexual assault
laws, meaning Carol’s female status no longer automatically labeled her as the
victim.11 The gender-neutral language of Kentucky’s statutory criminal misconduct
code ultimately gives prosecutors full discretion in characterizing one party as a
victim and the other as the perpetrator, although both engaged in the same wrongful
conduct.12
All states and the federal government have enacted a collection of crimes aimed
at punishing sex between two persons when at least one is under the age of consent.13
These crimes, which states collectively refer to as “statutory rape laws,” 14 have
grown organically from the social and legal distinctions made between boys and
girls. Early common law characterized sex with an underage female as harm to the
father’s property; loss of virginity decreased the child’s value as a bride.15 The crime
gave fathers retribution against males who took away their daughter’s chastity.16
Such a wrong deserved punishment.17
NEW YORKER (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-risingpressure-of-the-metoo-backlash [https://perma.cc/TK43-PUNG]; Caitlin Flanagan, The
Humiliation of Aziz Ansari, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/amp
/article/550541/?__twitter_impression=true [https://perma.cc/6XFW-TBB9].
9
B.H. v. Commonwealth, 494 S.W.3d 467, 468 (Ky. 2016); see also Bruce Schreiner,
Kentucky Court Rules In Underage Sex Case Involving Teens, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.
(Mar. 17, 2016, 10:31 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-kentucky-courtrules-in-underage-sex-case-2016mar17-story.html [https://perma.cc/HXK7-JHFF] (stating
that fifteen-year old Bill and thirteen-year-old Carol “had sex on two occasions . . . .”).
10
For purposes of this article, “statutory rape” is defined as non-forcible voluntary sex.
11
See infra Table A.
12
This Article only concerns itself with consensual sex: intercourse where both parties
are below the age of consent and knowingly agree to engage in the prohibited conduct.
13
See infra Table A.
14
See infra Table A. Few states include the term “statutory rape” in their terminology.
15
See Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875) (stating that the defendant was
convicted of taking an unmarried girl out of possession of her father).
16
See, e.g., Seagar v. Sligerland, 2 Cai. R. 219 (N.Y. 1805) (stating that where a
daughter is violated by force, a father “is entitled to compensation for the loss of her
service”).
17
Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for
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However, the gender-centric nature of statutory rape remained well after the
notion of females as property waned. Later, legislatures and courts cited prevention
of teenage pregnancy,18 reduction of numbers of “welfare moms,”19 and a general
desire to preserve young girls’ virtues20 as justification for criminalizing consensual
sex with female minors.
As recently as 1981, the Supreme Court, in Michael M. v. Superior Court of
Sonoma County, 21 endorsed unequal treatment between the sexes concerning
statutory rape. A plurality of the court held that California’s gender-specific
statutory rape law sought to protect harm that unevenly fell on females who, in their
opinion, bore the brunt of unwanted pregnancies and non-marital children.22 The
State’s justification was constitutionally permissible; it did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.23
While the Michael M. Justices endorsed a gendered norm, their opinion further
fueled the gender-neutral statutory rape laws movement, which had already begun
to take form.24 In response to Michael M., feminists, including Frances Olsen and
Ann Freedman, asserted that gender-based laws of the Michael M. type furthered the
stereotype of females as victims and unfairly oppressed women as they sought equal
status with men.25 Legislatures, that had not previously done so, reacted to Michael
M.’s endorsement of inequality. By 2000, all state legislatures had removed gender
distinctions from sexual assault crimes.26 Ideally, the goal of these laws was to treat
females and males equally, reduce the stigma of women as victims, alleviate a sense
of female oppression, and remedy other persistent historical gender stereotypes.27
Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 755 n.157 (2000) (“[S]tatutory rape laws were an
outgrowth of biblical precepts, by which virginity was so highly prized that the crime of rape
was punished by forcing the rapist to marry the victim.”) (citing Paula Abrams, The Tradition
of Reproduction, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 453, 465 (1995)).
18
See, e.g., Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 470 (1981) (“Here,
for example, the individual legislators may have voted for the statute for a variety of reasons.
Some legislators may have been concerned about preventing teenage pregnancies, others
about protecting young females from physical injury or from the loss of ‘chastity,’ and still
others about promoting various religious and moral attitudes towards premarital sex.”).
19
Caitlyn Silhan, The Present Case Does Involve Minors: An Overview of the
Discriminatory Effects of Romeo and Juliet Provisions and Sentencing Practices on Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Youth, 20 TUL. J.L. SEXUALITY 97, 106 (2011).
20
Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent: Toward a Generation of Statutory Rape Plans,
4 VA. J. OF SOC. POL’Y. & L. 287, 311 (1997).
21
450 U.S. at 495.
22
Id. at 470–71.
23
U.S. Const., amend XIV. See infra Part II.
24
See infra Part I.C.
25
See COCCA, supra note 1, at 73. See also infra Part I.C (discussing the feminist
critique of Michael M.).
26
See infra Table A.
27
Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Effects of
Rape Law Reform: How Far Have We Really Come, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554,
554–55 (1993).
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Unfortunately, the aspired-to reality is far from the ideal. Today, prosecutors
are three times more likely to charge males with statutory rape than they are to
charge females with the same crime.28 Parents of females alert authorities about the
prohibited sexual activity of their daughters at a rate that is largely disproportionate
to that of parents of males.29 The change to gender-neutral language, as it pertains to
prohibited sexual intimacy between consenting teens, is semantic at best but more
likely has created an unfortunate return to the female victimology paradigm that
proponents of gender-neutral statutory rape laws sought to erase.
The equality language of gender-neutral statutes plays a significant role in the
unfairness of its application. The unintended consequence of the shift to genderneutral statutory rape laws is the loss of labeling for the purpose of status. Traditional
statutory rape laws defined the female as “victim” and the male as “defendant.”30
The shift to gender-neutral language places the burden on prosecutors to choose
which partner to charge with statutory rape in cases of mutual consent to the same
prohibited conduct. Some statutes offer guidance to prosecutors, but others give
prosecutors unlimited discretion concerning which party to charge.31
Statutory rape laws fall into one of two categories: (1) thirty-four states have
enacted what this Article refers to as age-differential statutes; 32 and (2) the
remaining sixteen states have enacted what this Article refers to as arbitrary
prosecution statutes. 33 In jurisdictions with age-differential statutes, prosecutors
may only charge the perpetrator if he or she is older than the minor victim by a
legislatively-mandated number of years.34 Prosecutors in these states, therefore, are
28

See infra notes 193–205 and accompanying text. Males comprise over 75% of all
statutory rape prosecutions under age 16. KARYL TROUP-LEASURE & HOWARD M. SNYDER,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATUTORY RAPE KNOWN TO LAW E NFORCEMENT (2005), available
at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/208803.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5MC-JP5C].
29
See SHARON G. ELSTEIN & NOY DAVIS, A.B.A. CTR. ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW,
SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ADULT MALES AND YOUNG TEEN GIRLS: EXPLORING THE
LEGAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSES 22 (1997), available at http:// www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/migrated/child/PublicDocuments/statutory_rape.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma
.cc/M7RP-TADL].
30
See, e.g., Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 466 (1981)
(defining at the time CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 as “[u]nlawful sexual intercourse as ‘an act
of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the
female is under the age of 18 years.’ The statute thus makes men alone criminally liable for
the act of sexual intercourse.” (emphasis added)); cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(a) (2018)
(“Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person
who is not the spouse of the perpetrator, if the person is a minor.” (emphasis added)).
31
See infra Table A.
32
See infra Table A; infra Part II.A.
33
See infra Part II.B.
34
See infra Table A; infra Part II.A; BRITTANY LOGINO SMITH & GLEN A. KERCHER,
CRIME VICTIM’S INSTITUTE, ADOLESCENT SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 8–10 (2011),
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=
8&ved=0ahUKEwjo27q725TXAhXp6oMKHSmvBGcQFggtMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2F
www.crimevictimsinstitute.org%2Fdocuments%2FAdolescent_Behavior_3.1.11.pdf&usg=
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limited in prosecuting for statutory rape to instances where the perpetrator is at least
three years—and in some states as much as five years—older than the victim.35 The
justification for age-differential statutes is a recognition that underage minors
sometimes choose to engage in consensual sexual intimacy. In jurisdictions with
arbitrary prosecution statutes, the states have adopted laws that are silent about
whom to charge. 36 These states have remedied the unequal treatment between
genders but fail to remove from culpability teens who wish to explore sexual
intimacy with a partner.
Age-differential prosecution statutes provide some limitations on prosecutors
since the prosecutor does not have the power to charge the younger of two
consenting teens even though both chose to engage in the legally-prohibited act.
Arbitrary prosecution statutes, however, allow prosecutors to charge either party
when two minors consent to the same sexual misconduct. Consequently, arbitrary
prosecution statutes grant prosecutors a level of discretion that potentially thwarts
the announced objectives of equality under the law.37 Age differential legislation
places limited boundaries on whom the prosecution can charge, but like arbitrary
prosecution statutes, prosecutors enforce the law against males at a significantly
higher rate than against females.38
To be sure, there are benefits to gender-neutral statutory rape laws. These
statutes have expanded the prosecutor’s arsenal to allow prosecution for occurrences
of sexual violence against men and inappropriate relations between adult females
and minor males. 39 But in the case of prosecution between “minors” who have
chosen to engage in sexual relations, the victim tends to be the party whose parents
reach out to the police.40 More often than not, a parent of a middle-class female seeks
retributive justice, leaving the male to suffer the consequences of the mutual

AOvVaw14QKlR8PdpLAYyHyNE_0N1 [http://perma.cc/49XC-B4VM]; see also HANNAH
CARTWRIGHT, GLOB. JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LEGAL AGE OF CONSENT FOR MARRIAGE AND SEX
FOR THE 50 UNITED STATES (2011), https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&
source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwji15mN2pTXAhWo34MKHevSB5
0QFghpMAo&url=https%3A%2F%2Fglobaljusticeinitiative.files.wordpress.com%2F2011
%2F12%2Funited-states-age-of-consent-table11.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1DlBi9K_nDtEISv0kk
0dgm [https://perma.cc/5TKN-E28T].
35
See infra Table A.
36
See infra Table A.
37
See infra Part II.
38
See, e.g., Helen Smith, How the law punishes boys who are raped: Column, USA
TODAY (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/09/03/child-supportstatutory-rape-justice-law-men-column/15044791/
[https://perma.cc/YL6D-MJF2]
(discussing double standard).
39
See generally Iowa v. Romer, 832 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 2013) (convicting a high school
teacher of sexual exploitation after having sexual relations with a 15-year-old student);
Kansas v. Edwards, 288 P.3d 494 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (convicting a teacher under statute
prohibiting teacher from having consensual relations with a student); Oberman, supra note
17.
40
See Oberman, supra note 17, at 749–50.
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decision41 and further perpetuating the stereotype of the female as the victim and the
male as the aggresor.42 Parents’ power to influence prosecution decisions by calling
attention to authorities and using the social or political capital to urge prosecutors to
file charges, coupled with prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions, have
essentially returned females to the more vulnerable status that gender-neutral laws
sought to eradicate.
This Article illustrates how movements for increased equality between men and
women can fail to meet their stated goals. Using the example of statutory rape laws,
this Article explains how the legislative shift from gender-specific to gender-neutral
terminology, brought on in part by feminists seeking an egalitarian society, has
failed to achieve the goal of increasing equality between males and females and, in
many ways, led to a return to the historical paradigm of girls as both powerless and
property.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I reviews the history of the legal and
social movement from gender-specific to gender-neutral statutory rape laws. This
Part includes an exploration of critical scholarship responding to the Supreme
Court’s Michael M. decision. Part II explains the limitations of gender-specific
legislation. This Part illustrates that there are two categories of gender-neutral
statutory rape jurisdictions: age-differential statutes and arbitrary prosecution
statutes. This Part also explores challenges to these statutes, particularly arbitrary
prosecution statutes, on equal protection grounds. Part III provides empirical data
that men are prosecuted at a rate four times greater than females and catalogs the
overwhelming disparity between the prosecution of teenage males for consensual
statutory rape and prosecution of teenage females for the same crimes. Part IV tests
the outcomes of statutory rape prosecutions and considers whether the move to
gender-neutral rape laws has achieved feminists’ goals such as removing female
stereotypes and granting females more power over their own sexuality. Ultimately,
this Article highlights how cultural movements can have long-simmering,
unintended consequences, and the pernicious effects of the legislative shift to
gender-neutrality stands as a cautionary tale to the #MeToo movement and its fight
for workplace equality. This Article concludes with hope, offering a solution for
change in the future.
41
See infra notes 189–192 and accompanying text. This article is limited to instances
of heterosexual statutory rape for purposes of proving the gender divide. To be sure,
homosexual statutory rape as applied to teens engaged in consenting sexual intimacy is
equally problematic. See generally Commonwealth v. Washington W., 928 N.E.2d 908
(Mass. 2010) (charging a 15-year-old juvenile with statutory rape after father of complainant
learned of the incidents); State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005) (overturning statutory
rape law that punished same sex couples more harshly than heterosexual couples).
42
See generally Kari Paul, Rigid gender stereotypes tied to increased depression,
violence and suicide in children, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 20, 2017),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/rigid-gender-stereotypes-tied-to-increased-depressionviolence-and-suicide-in-children-2017-09-20 [http://perma.cc/7BPC-SFUK] (noting in a 15
country study the reinforcement of gender stereotypes from childhood where “boys were
taught to be the aggressors in romantic and sexual relationships.”).
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I. GENDERED STATUTORY RAPE LAWS
Since their inception, until a little less than a half-century ago, statutory rape
laws permitted prosecution of males only. Gendered statutory rape laws originated
with the codification of sex crimes in England. 43 The Statute of Westminster
prohibited sex with a female under 12.44 Girls under twelve were considered unable
to consent to sexual intercourse.45 Colonial America adopted English codification of
sex with a minor but viewed the violation as a property crime. 46 Male vaginal
penetration decreased a female’s dowry. 47 Long after the concept of females as
property receded, gender-specific statutory rape laws remained to protect women
and the state from unwed pregnancies and perceived burdens on the welfare
system.48 As recently as 1981, the Supreme Court upheld the unequal treatment of
men and women for purposes of statutory rape laws.49 In Michael M. v. Superior
Court of Sonoma County, the Court ruled that the need for protection of decidedly
female interests justified California’s gender-specific statutory rape laws. 50
Response to the decision was harsh. Feminist groups called on states to reject the
ruling and instead adopt gender-neutral statutory rape laws to remove socially
entrenched notions of females as weak and oppressed.51

43

COCCA, supra note 1, at 10–11.
Id. at 10.
45
Id.
46
Lewis Bossing, Note, Now Sixteen Could Get You Life: Statutory Rape, Meaningful
Consent, and the Implications for Federal Sentence Enhancement, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1205,
1220 (1998) (“At Common Law, rape was seen as a property crime, where a woman’s
‘honor,’ ‘purity,’ or ‘virginity’ were stolen from her husband or father.”); see also Michael
M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 494–95 (1981) (describing the policy that
underlined colonial statutory rape by saying, “because their chastity was considered
particularly precious, those young women were felt to be uniquely in need of the state’s
protection”).
47
Alice Schlegel, Status, Property, and the Value on Virginity, 18 AM. ETHNOLOGIST
719 (Nov. 1991).
48
Michael M., 450 U.S. at 479–81.
49
Id. at 475–77.
50
See generally Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (holding
that a statutory rape law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it was
sufficiently related to the State’s strong interest in preventing teenage pregnancy).
51
Maria Louise Payne, Constitutionality of Statutory Rape: Michael v. Superior Court
of Sonoma County, 17 TULSA L. REV. 350, 370–71 (1981).
44
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A. Statutory Rape: A Brief History
Statutory rape is sexual intercourse with a person under the age of lawful
consent. 52 Unlike nonconsensual intercourse, 53 the state can charge an alleged
perpetrator with statutory rape regardless of consent.54 The law applies with force
against one party, even though both parties committed the same act and intended to
engage in the forbidden conduct.55
Punishment for consensual intercourse with a woman dates back at least to
1285. 56 From the thirteenth century through much of the twentieth, the law
prohibited only sexual intercourse with a female. 57 The Statute of Westminster,
declared girls under the age of twelve incapable of consenting to sex,58 apparently
choosing that age as the age of puberty.59 Prepubescents could not bear children, and
there was no procreative value to sexual encounters. Consequently, legislatures felt
legitimized in protecting these young girls’ interests in chastity and future
marriageability.60
Drawing the age line at puberty was a function of delineating between an age
when girls could and could not procreate.61 Statutory rape laws are inextricably tied
52

Although many states do not use the term “statutory rape” in their statutes, it has
come to mean sexual relations with a minor under the age of consent. For purposes of this
article, “statutory rape” means sexual intercourse with a person under the age of consent.
53
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN UPDATED DEFINITION OF RAPE (2012), https://www.justice.
gov/archives/opa/blog/updated-definition-rape
[http://perma.cc/33RC-KYWR]
(“The
penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or anus with any body part or object, or oral
penetration by a sex organ of another person, without the consent of the victim.”).
54
Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare
Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 335 (2003).
55
Id. at 334–36.
56
COCCA, supra note 1, at 10–11 (noting that prior to the Statute of Westminster, the
female’s consent barred a rape conviction).
57
COCCA, supra note 1, at 9 (“The laws originally were gender-specific: They punished
a male who had sexual intercourse with a female, who was not his wife, under the age of
consent . . . .”).
58
Luisa A. Fuentes, The 14th Amendment and Sexual Consent: Statutory Rape and
Judiciary Progeny, 16 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 139, 139–40 (1994); see also Holly Brewer,
The Historical Links Between Children, Justice, and Democracy, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y 339, 340 (2006) (“The first statutory rape law passed under Queen Elizabeth,
concerned only girls and set the age below which consent was irrelevant at 10.”).
59
Marsha Greenfield, Protecting Lolita: Statutory Rape Laws in Feminist Perspective,
1 WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 4 (1977).
60
See State v. Rundlett, 391 A.2d 815 (Me. 1978) (noting the legislative intent behind
the statutory rape laws of some other states is to preserve chastity); MARY E. ODEM,
DELINQUENT DAUGHTERS: PROTECTING AND POLICING ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY IN THE
UNITED STATES 1885–1920, at 13 (1995) (noting the legislative reaction to laws that allowed
girls as young as ten “to be legally capable of giving ‘consent’ to her own corruption . . . .”).
61
Rundlett, 391 A.2d at 820; see also Michael Castleman, Age of Consent: How Old Is
Old Enough for Sex?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.
com/us/blog/all-about-sex/201702/age-consent-how-old-is-old-enough-sex [http://perma.
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to marriage. “A young girl’s worth depended upon her ability to secure a marriage
that would promise economic security[,] and her ability to marry depended on her
sexual purity.”62 Statutory rape laws existed to deter both parties from ruining the
“pure” girl and securing retribution against the male who robbed a father of that
value.63
Over time, the notion of girls (and all children) as property waned. States
shifted their justification of statutory rape laws from girls as property to girls as
“girls,” weaker than boys and unable to protect themselves from harm.64
States also were concerned with the anatomical uniqueness of females—the
ability to become pregnant and carry babies to term.65 Thus, while many American
states cited protecting girls’ chastity as justification for statutory rape statutes, 66
legislative intent broadened to other social, emotional, and even financial harms that
could result, all of which centered on young girls’ need of protection, including from
unwanted pregnancies67 and the need to prevent an increase in welfare mothers.68
cc/47WX-AXDB] (noting that under the traditional biblical view, “sex is legitimate only for
procreation.”); cf. Jordan Franklin, Where Art Thou, Privacy? Expanding Privacy Rights of
Minors in Regard to Consensual Sex: Statutory Rape Laws and the Need for a Romeo and
Juliet Exception, 64 J. MARSHALL. L. REV. 309, 312 (2012) (“The low age of consent, and
gender specific language, reflected the historical ideology of women, as in need of male
protection and possessions.”).
62
Kay L. Levine, No Penis, No Problem, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 357 (2006); see also
Greenfield, supra note 59, at 4–5.
63
Levine, supra note 62, at 107; see Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S.
464, 494–96 (“Until very recently, no California court or commentator had suggested that
the purpose of California’s statutory rape law was to protect young women from the risk of
pregnancy. Indeed, the historical development of § 261.5 demonstrates that the law was
initially enacted on the premise that young women, in contrast to young men, were to be
deemed legally incapable of consenting to an act of sexual intercourse. Because their chastity
was considered particularly precious, those young women were felt to be uniquely in need
of the state’s protection. In contrast, young men were assumed to be capable of making such
decisions for themselves; the law therefore did not offer them any special protection.”
(citation omitted)); see generally Maryanne Lyons, Comment, Adolescents in Jeopardy: An
Analysis of Texas’ Promiscuity Defense for Sexual Assault, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 583, 616
(1992) (exploring Texas statutory rape law and its relation to early common law).
64
See Michael M., 450 U.S. at 495.
65
See, e.g., Teenage Pregnancy Prevention Act of 1995, A.B. 1490, 1996 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 1996) (citing legislative concerns of pregnancy out of wedlock and welfare mothers).
66
Michael M., 450 U.S. at 494–95 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also COCCA, supra
note 1, at 11.
67
Leslie G. Landau, Gender-Based Statutory Rape Law Does Not Violate the Equal
Protection Clause: Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
1109, 1116 (1982).
68
See State v. La Mere, 655 P.2d. 46, 50 (Idaho 1982) (“The State points out that
statistics obtained from the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare and the Planned
Parenthood Association of Idaho, Inc. show that in 1980 Idaho women gave birth to 20,140
children. Of those children, approximately 13% were born to mothers who were 19 years of
age or less. Abortion statistics indicate that in both 1979 and 1980 approximately 30% of the
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From a more social perspective, states focused on the perceived weakness and
fragility of girls, seeking to prevent victimization of immaturity69 and implying that
girls lacked the judgment or the responsibility necessary in sexual decisionmaking.70
B. The Legality of Gender-Specific Statutory Rape Laws
Well into the twentieth century, every state had gender-specific statutory rape
laws. Gradually, states began to redraft statutes in gender-neutral terms.71 Although
many legislatures remained committed to their stereotypical beliefs that young
women needed protection from sexual relations regardless of whether there was
consent, they identified separate reasons for extending statutory rape laws to protect
underage males. The idea that males would engage in sex with other males and that
females could be held accountable for taking advantage of male youths prompted
many state legislators to vote for neutral language.72
As legislatures tried to dismantle gender inequality, courts remained committed
to upholding the constitutionality of gender-specific rape laws.73 The decisions were
particularly curious; many states with gender-specific statutory rape laws had
neutralized most other state statutes.74 In at least a handful of states, courts upheld
gender-specific statutes.75 In some instances, courts upheld the constitutionality of

legal abortions performed in Idaho were performed on girls who were between the ages of
10 and 19 years.”).
69
Cf. People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673, 676–77(Cal. 1964) (regarding good faith
belief of victim’s age); see Oberman, supra note 17, at 737 (“Statutory rape laws are
predicated upon the belief that certain individuals are so vulnerable to sexual exploitation
that they are incapable of consenting to sex.”).
70
See COCCA, supra note 1, at 15.
71
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3503 (1969); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS §
750.520d (1973); see also Payne, supra note 51, at 372–73.
72
COCCA, supra note 1, at 66.
73
See, e.g., State v. La Mere, 655 P.2d 46, 49–50 (Idaho 1982) (holding Idaho law did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the state had an important interest in
preventing and reducing teen pregnancies); but cf. Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602, 609
(1st Cir. 1977) (noting that, at that time, only New Hampshire’s gender-specific statute had
been ruled unconstitutional).
74
See Barnes v. State, 260 S.E.2d 40 (Ga. 1979) (holding that a gender-specific
statutory rape law was not invalid even though legislature had adopted other gender-neutral
sexual assault laws). Compare Murphey v. Murphey, 653 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1982) (noting that
Idaho adopted a gender-neutral divorce maintenance statute in 1980) with State v. Joslin, 175
P.3d 764 (Idaho 2007) (holding that state rape law, which punishes males, does not violate
equal protection clause). See also Michael B. v. Sendi Diann W., 467 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1983) (noting that New York amended the Family Court Act in 1977 to adopt
gender-neutral language); People v M.K.R., 632 N.Y.S.2d 382 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 1995) (noting
that New York adopted gender neutral language in its rape laws in 1987).
75
See La Mere, 655 P.2d at 46.
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the challenged statute even though the legislature adopted gender-neutral statutory
rape laws after the defendant’s conviction.76
For example, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge
to the state’s gender-specific rape laws, despite the legislature’s adoption of a
gender-neutral scheme the prior year. 77 The court found a compelling governmental
interest in protecting teen girls from pregnancy, an injury that males cannot sustain.78
Similarly, Nevada’s Supreme Court considered whether Nevada’s gender-specific
statutory rape law served important governmental objectives and whether the law
was substantially related to achievement of those objectives.79 The court found a
compelling state interest in preventing teen pregnancy. 80 It reasoned that
“[p]regnancy carries with it attendant medical, psychological, sociological, and
moral problems which a young female may not be able to maturely consider or even
fully fathom or appreciate.” 81 Since “female[s] can become pregnant while . . .
male[s] cannot,” the gender-based statute withstood constitutional scrutiny.82
In one case, a Texas court rested its denial of a federal equal-protection claim
against Texas’s gender-specific statutory rape law on state history, considering the
constitutionality of a law that criminalized sexual intercourse with a female under
seventeen. 83 Texas defined sexual intercourse as “any penetration of the female sex
organ by the male sex organ.”84 The court opined that statutory rape laws had been
on the books for many years and it was therefore “a little bit late” in the history of
such laws to contend that they violated equal protection.85
One federal court found differently from the state courts that upheld genderspecific statutory rape crimes. In Meloon v. Helgemoe,86 the First Circuit ruled that
New Hampshire’s statutory rape scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 87 After his arrest for statutory rape, the defendant
76
See, e.g., State v. Gray, 595 P.2d. 990 (Ariz. 1979) (upholding conviction from 1974,
five years prior to the legislative change); see also People v. Dieudonne, 544 N.Y.S.2d 704
(N.Y. App. Term 1989) (noting that it is the legislature’s role to adopt gender-neutral
language in statutory rape laws).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 991–92; see also State v. Kelly, 526 P.2d 720, 723 (Ariz. 1974) (finding a
state’s interest in protecting teen pregnancies, which requires treating males and females
differently, entirely reasonable in light of the fact that the psychological and sociological
reasons to protect females do not exist for males); see also In re Interest of J.D.G., 498
S.W.2d 786, 791–92 (Mo. 1973) (stating the lack of a minimum male age requirement for
prosecution of statutory rape does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because only a
female can suffer the adverse consequences of pregnancy while a male cannot).
79
Olson v. State, 588 P.2d 1018, 1019 (Nev. 1979).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Ex Parte Groves, 571 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
84
Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01(3)).
85
Id. at 892.
86
564 F.2d 602(1st Cir. 1977).
87
Id. at 608–09.
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challenged the gender-specific law.88 All other New Hampshire laws were genderneutral89 at the time of defendant’s arrest. He argued first in state court and then in
federal court90 that the statute, which did not make it a crime for a woman to engage
in consensual sexual intercourse with a male under the age of fifteen, violated equal
protection.91
The First Circuit agreed and struck down the statute, finding New Hampshire’s
stated interest in preventing teen pregnancy and its assumption of the psychological
strength of males and the psychological weakness of females failed to further a
legitimate goal.92 The New Hampshire law had the “mirror image effect . . . that by
only penalizing one gender of offenders, males, for committing a heterosexual
offense, the state necessarily left the potential victims of that offense of the same
gender, young males, without protection.”93 Although decided at the federal level,
the Meloon court made clear that its decision was only binding in cases that applied
New Hampshire law.94
Four years after Meloon, the United States Supreme Court ruled in a case that
directly addressed the issue of whether gender-specific statutory rape laws violated
equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1980, in the case of
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, a male minor challenged
California’s gender-specific statutory rape law.95 Contrary to Meloon, Michael M.
upheld the right of states to treat males and females differently to punish for statutory
rape, citing prevention of teen pregnancy and the state interest in minimizing
children born out of wedlock as a compelling justification for the law.96

88

Id. at 603.
Id. (“All of the other New Hampshire laws regulating sexual behavior which were
brought to the attention of this court, as they pertain to the conduct of consenting parties, are
gender neutral and apply equally to men and women.”).
90
Following the decision of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire to uphold Meloon’s
conviction, Meloon filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 605 (“New Hampshire suggests four ‘reasons’ for its classification scheme: (1)
part of the class of males under the age of 15, pre-pubescent males, are physiologically
incapable of becoming victims of this consensual offense; therefore the class of victims
vulnerable to women offenders is smaller than the class of victims vulnerable to male
offenders; (2) adult males, due to a psychological disorder known as pedophilia or otherwise,
are more likely to seek to commit the offense than adult women; therefore the class of
potential male offenders is larger than the class of potential women offenders; (3) female
children are more likely to suffer physical damage during the commission of the offense than
are male children; thus the class of female victims is in danger of more severe injury than
their male counterparts; (4) only female victims may become pregnant; thus again the class
of female victims may suffer more severe repercussions from the offense than will their male
counterparts.”).
93
Id. at 609.
94
Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602, 609 (1st Cir. 1977).
95
Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 467 (1981).
96
Id. at 470.
89
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Just after midnight on June 3, 1978, while California’s gender-specific law was
still in effect, seventeen-and-a-half-year-old Michael approached Sharon, who was
sixteen and a half at the time.97 The two had been drinking.98 Despite evidence at
trial that Sharon said “no” to Michael’s initial advances, and that Michael struck
Sharon in the face, concurring justices based their decision on their interpretation or
assumption that Sharon submitted to sexual intercourse with Michael.99 The State of
California charged Michael with “unlawful sexual intercourse with a female under
the age of 18 years.”100 Michael challenged the statute arguing that it violated state
and federal law because it discriminated based on gender.101
The trial court and the intermediate appellate court denied Michael’s request
for relief.102 The California Supreme Court’s narrow majority acknowledged that the
statute discriminated based on sex but found that the discrimination survived
intermediate-scrutiny review and was therefore constitutional. 103 The California
Supreme Court noted that “Changeless physical law, [that only females can become
pregnant] coupled with the tragic human cost of illegitimate teen pregnancies”
supported the state’s compelling governmental interest in retaining the genderspecific law.104 Even if the court had believed differently, California Supreme Court
Justice Richardson noted that only the legislature could enact a gender-neutral
statute.105
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. California continued to
defend its statute as necessary to prevent teenage pregnancy and the costs associated
with unwanted births.106 One of the defendant’s principal arguments was that the
97

Id. at 466.
Id. at 466–67.
99
According to Justice Blackmun, Sharon appeared “not to have been an unwilling
participant in at least the initial stages of the intimacies that took place the night of June 3,
1978.” Id. at 483. Scholars have questioned this finding of fact, suggesting that her
reaction—though abstractly appearing consensual—was actually coerced. See, e.g., Carol
Sanger, Girls and the Getaway: Culture, and the Predicament of Gendered Space, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 705, 732 n.101 (1995) (citing Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist
Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387, 416–17 (1984) (disagreeing with the
characterization of the sexual encounter in Michael M. as consensual and describing the
Michael M. transcript as “a forceful indictment of our present gender system”)).
100
Michael M., 450 U.S. at 466 (1981) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 1981)
(prohibiting “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the
perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years”) (emphasis added)).
101
Michael M., 450 U.S. at 466.
102
Id. at 467.
103
Id. (explaining that, despite the fact that the California Supreme Court incorrectly
used a more difficult “strict scrutiny” standard for gender-based classification rather than the
appropriate intermediate scrutiny test, the California Supreme Court nonetheless upheld the
statute by finding a compelling state interest which justified gender classifications and that
both the state and federal constitutional equal protection requirements were satisfied).
104
Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 601 P.2d 572, 574 (1979).
105
Id. at 577.
106
Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 470 (1981).
98
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statute impermissibly presumed that between two consenting teens under age
eighteen, only the male could be the aggressor.107 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
plurality, rejected the assertion. Casting Michael M.’s argument as one of age rather
than gender, the Justice wrote: “the age of the man” is irrelevant because young men
are just as capable as older men of causing pregnancy.108 Concerning the gender
divide, the plurality noted that the gender-specific statute was a permissible attempt
by the legislature to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancy. 109 The threat of
prosecution provided an additional deterrent to young men from engaging in activity
that would have a deleterious impact primarily on young women.110
Thus, the plurality found the statute constitutional, notwithstanding the fact that
it differentiated between the sexes. 111 The biology of procreation demanded
protection of underage girls.112 Noting that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate
standard of review, 113 the Court ruled that the gender-specific statute was
sufficiently related to the state’s interest in preventing teenage pregnancy because
“virtually all of the significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences
of teenage pregnancy fall on the young female.”114
Justice Stewart, who concurred, approved of the state’s legislative efforts to
encourage males to share in the obligation of birth control. He joined Justice
Rehnquist’s finding that men and women, “are not similarly situated with respect to
the problems and risks associated with [sexual] intercourse . . . .”115 In his view, the
law encouraged abstinence, operating as a self-imposed birth control method for
men.116
107

Id. at 475. The defendant also argued that (1) the statute is impermissibly underinconclusive and must hold a female responsible, too, and (2) the statute is impermissibly
broad because it criminalizes intercourse with prepubescent girls, who cannot get pregnant.
The plurality dismissed both arguments. It noted that accepting that a gender-neutral
statute could frustrate the state’s interest in effective enforcement because a girl would be
less likely to report violations if she knew she also could be prosecuted. Id. at 473–74; since
the area is already “fraught with prosecutorial difficulties,” id. at 474, the plurality rejected
this argument. It rejected the second argument as well, characterizing it as “ludicrous.” Id. at
475.
108
Id. at 475.
109
Id. at 470.
110
Id. at 474.
111
Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 472–73 (1981).
112
Id. at 473.
113
Id. at 468–69. But see Landau, supra note 67, at 1115 (disputing the Court’s position
on equal protection).
114
Michael M., 450 U.S. at 473. The court further explained that “teenage pregnancies,
which have increased dramatically over the last two decades, have significant social,
medical, and economic consequences for both the mother and her child, and the State. Of
particular concern to the state is that approximately half of all teenage pregnancies end in
abortion. And of those children who are born, their illegitimacy makes them likely candidates
to become wards of the State.” Id. at 470–71.
115
Id. at 479 (Stewart, J., concurring).
116
Id. at. 480. In addition, Justice Blackmun agreed with the holding as a constitutional
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Four Justices dissented from the opinion.117 Justices Marshall and White joined
Justice Brennan in disagreeing with the plurality.118 In their opinion, females had
great incentive to decide whether to engage in sex “because their chastity was
considered particularly precious . . . . [Y]oung men were assumed to be capable of
making such decisions for themselves; the law, therefore, did not offer them any
special protection.”119
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent. He argued that laws prohibiting
consensual intercourse between teens, even nondiscriminatory laws, would not serve
to achieve the states’ interest in preventing teenage sex. 120 He dismissed as
“fanciful” Justice Rehnquist’s assumption that the risk of pregnancy had effectively
deterred young women from “participation in the risk-creating conduct” and that
women, therefore, did not need the additional deterrence of criminal liability.121 The
dissenting Justices collectively implied there was a puritan ethos behind statutory
rape laws and such an ethos was no longer a permissible justification for punishing
Michael.122
The Court’s decision in Michael M. threatened to stall statutory rape reform.
By 1981, most states and the Supreme Court had ruled against equal-protection
challenges to gender-specific sexual assault legislation, upholding a state’s right to
adopt gender differential statutes. 123 In each instance, the courts cited several
concerns, including a state’s interest in preventing teenage pregnancies and the
burdens these pregnancies placed on the states to support unwed mothers.124 The
need to minimize “the negative psychological effect” that statutory rape unduly has
on females who, they presumed, bore an uneven responsibility for the children born
out of wedlock, also justified the courts’ decisions.125
Rather than fortifying states’ rights to have gender-specific statutory rape laws,
decisions upholding a state’s right to treat males differently than females to punish
statutory rape, most notably Michael M., fortified the gender-neutral reform
matter but felt that in this specific fact pattern, statutory rape should not be prosecuted at all.
Id. at 483–85.
117
Justice Brennan wrote a dissent, which Justices White and Marshall joined. Justice
Brennan observed that the California “law was initially enacted on the premise that young
women, in contrast with young men, were . . . legally incapable of consenting to an act of
sexual intercourse.” Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 494 (1981).
118
Id.
119
Id. at 494–96 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan’s dissent further argued that the
“sexual stereotypes” that justified the gender-specific law’s initial passage were “outmoded”
and thus could no longer be used to justify the gender-specific language of the statute;
consequently, the law should cease to exist. Id. at 496.
120
Id. at 497–99.
121
Id. at 498.
122
See id. at 495 (noting that a female’s “chastity was considered particularly
precious”).
123
See supra Part I.B.
124
Id.
125
See Carolyn Cocca, Prosecuting Mrs. Robinson? Gender, Sexuality, and Statutory
Rape Laws, 16 MICH. FEMINIST STUD. 61, 65–66 (2002).
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movement. Some scholars asserted that state legislatures should adopt a broader
view of equal protection than courts had, at least as a policy matter, viewing the laws
from sociological and political contexts. 126 Moreover, non-government actors,
particularly members of the feminist movement, raised their voices to call attention
to the inherent injustice, negative consequences, and threatened continued
stereotypes that would result from decisions upholding gender-specific laws. 127
Arguably, legislatures’ and feminists’ mutual rejection of court decisions upholding
gender-specific legislation ultimately resulted in national gendered statutory rape
law reform.
C. A Feminist Push for Statutory Rape Reform
Curiously, Michael M. retreated from what had become a trend towards
recognizing formal equality between men and women. 128 In previous years, the
Court had stricken legislative discrimination by sex in cases concerning the right to
buy beer,129 the right to dispose of property,130 and laws favoring men over women
for appointments as administrators of decedents’ estates.131 But while Michael M.’s
ruling seemed a retreat from gains in the women’s equality movement, it spurred
new momentum for feminists who, by the end of the 1970s, were beginning to reflect
on their achievements.132
126

See Rebecca J. Laurer, Fourteenth Amendment—Statutory Rape: Protection of
Minor Female and Prosecution of Minor Male, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 1374, 1390
(1981) (“Once an age of consent is determined by a legislature, statutory rape laws should
apply equally to males and females below that age unless the state can prove that the sexes
are similarly situated with regard to the risk of injuries, both physical and psychological, that
can result from engaging in sexual intercourse.”).
127
See, e.g., Cocca, supra note 125, at 68 (“[Liberal feminists] felt that young males
should not be neglected as victims, and that the gender-specific laws formally inscribed the
stereotypes of male-as-aggressor and female-as-victim in the realm of sexuality and therefore
had to go.”).
128
See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); see also Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976); see also Fred Barbash, Burger Court May Be onto True Mission: After 12
Years Seeking a Mission, the Burger Court May Have One, WASH. POST, July 3, 1981, at
A1.
129
See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (reversing the district court’s
outcome and holding beer purchase discrimination on the basis of sex was not substantially
related to the achievement of a legitimate government objective).
130
DEFINING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, THE ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS (Dec. 2014), http://www.stopvaw.org/defining_discrimination_against_women_3
[https://perma.cc/6XTQ-7CV7].
131
See generally Reed v. Reed, 401 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding unconstitutional
preferential treatment of males versus females as estate executor’s solely on the basis of sex).
132
There was a strong feminist movement in the 1960s, which strongly influenced the
future discussions surrounding the topic of rape. Public conversation regarding rape was
historically non-existent but was exposed by the feminist movement, leading to political
activism. See generally ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, REDEFINING RAPE: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN
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Feminist lobbying groups, most notably the National Organization for Women,
conducted a state-by-state effort to change sexual misconduct laws.133
At the same time, legal scholars produced a series of critical works seeking
nationwide uniformity in statutory rape law reform.134 Post-Michael M., legislative
adoption of gender-neutral statutory rape laws took on a new purpose. Not only did
these laws aim at punishing same-sex pedophiles or female teachers who seduce
their male students, but they also sought to meet the most foundational goals of
formal-equality feminists: the equal treatment of both sexes under the law.135
Frances Olsen, for example, argued that Michael M. “mask[s] and legitimiz[es]
conditions of social existence that are hurtful and damaging to women.” 136 By
restricting the sexual activity of young women, the Court reinforced the “double
standard of sexual morality.”137 Michelle Oberman argued that the ruling reinforced
the outdated stereotype 138 of women in need of protection. 139 Luisa Fuentes
discussed that it would give power to the inferiority rhetoric, suggesting that only
men can be coercive.140
THE ERA OF SUFFRAGE AND SEGREGATION 279 (2013); see, e.g., Constance Grady, The waves
of feminism, and why people keep fighting over them, explained, VOX (July 20, 2018 9:57

AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/3/20/16955588/feminism-waves-explained-first-secondthird-fourth [https://perma.cc/H8WR-3AKA] (discussing in part the “second wave” of
feminism and rape).
133
David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 320 (2000).
134
See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); Anne E. Freedman, Sex
Equality, Sex Differences and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE. L.J. 913 (1983).
135
See infra Part IV; see also Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape a Feminist Critique of
Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387, 398 (1984) (highlighting that feminists want “equal
treatment,” not “special” treatment); Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: ReEvaluating Modern Statutory Rape Laws, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 29 (1994)
[hereinafter Oberman, Turning Girls into Women] (stating that second-wave feminists
thought laws that characterized females as victims violated female autonomy and represented
repressive and puritanical control of female sexuality); Martha M. Ertman, Legal
Tenderness: Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 545, 555
(2006) (noting that some second-wave feminists wanted to abolish statutory rape entirely
and “first-wave feminism sought political citizenship for women through reforms such as
female suffrage, and second-wave feminists similarly fought to reform rape law and secure
reproductive freedoms”); see generally Bridget J. Crawford, Toward a Third-Wave Feminist
Legal Theory: Young Women, Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure, 14 MICH. J. GENDER
& L. 99 (2007) (discussing equality and inequality in different contexts). But see Note,
Feminist Legal Analysis and Sexual Autonomy: Using Statutory Rape Laws as an
Illustration, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1080 (1999) (“Feminists from the substantive equality
school favor statutory rape laws under existing conditions because these laws at least protect
the most vulnerable women from the harms of sexual activities.”).
136
Olsen, Turning Girls into Women, supra note 135, at 427.
137
Id. at 417.
138
Oberman, Turning Girls into Women, supra note 135, at 68–70.
139
Id. at 120 (“Commentators note that the laws reflected the historical legal perception
of women and girls as ‘special property in need of special protection.’”).
140
Fuentes, supra note 58, at 146.
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Gender-specific laws, scholars also argued, robbed women of their sexuality.
Frances Olsen asserted that Michael M. reinforced the oppressive restriction upon a
minor female’s freedom to make independent sexual decisions and violated a
minor’s right to privacy and consent to sexual intercourse as freely as her male
counterpart.141 Others suggested that the decision unfairly deprived girls of the right
to own their sexuality, a matter that was particularly shameful since states granted
boys that right. 142 Nationwide adoption of gender-neutral statutory rape laws,
feminist scholars argued, would prevent government intrusion into female sexual
decision-making and remove traditional stereotypes of females as the weaker sex.143
These, and other scholarly voices, joined the national feminist movement’s call for
formal equality within state statutory rape laws.
D. State-by-State Reform
A handful of state legislatures adopted formal equality for their statutory rape
laws during the first half of the 1970s. 144 These states were persuaded by the
argument that minor males needed protection from predatory adults, both male and
141
Olsen, supra note 135, at 405; see also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 740 n.7 (1982) (citing Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981) (invalidating
statute “that gave husband, as ‘head and master’ of property jointly owned with his wife, the
unilateral right to dispose of such property without his spouse’s consent”); Wengler v.
Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 147 (1980) (invalidating law under which the
benefits “that the working woman can expect to be paid to her spouse in the case of her workrelated death are less than those payable to the spouse of the deceased male wage earner”);
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14–15, 17 (1975) (invalidating statute that provided a shorter
period of parental support obligation for female children than for male children); Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) (invalidating statute that failed to grant a woman
worker “the same protection which a similarly situated male worker would have received”);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973) (invalidating statute containing a
“mandatory preference for male applicants”); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971)
(invalidating an “arbitrary preference established in favor of males” in the administration of
decedent’s estates).
142
Fuentes, supra note 58, at 151 (“If sex is viewed as a privilege, for a state to say that
a girl of a certain age is neither legally nor factually capable of consenting to that act while
boys are able to consent to sex at any age with any woman that girl has been deprived of a
right that her male counterpart has been allowed to engage in.”); Deborah Tolman, Doing
Desire: Adolescent Girls’ Struggles for/with Sexuality, 8 GENDER & SOC’Y 324, 325 (1994)
(“[G]irls are taught to recognize and keep a lid on the sexual desire of boys but not taught to
acknowledge or even to recognize their own sexual feelings.”).
143
See, e.g., Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences and the Supreme Court,
92 YALE L.J. 913, 943–45 (1983) (critiquing the concept of “real” sex differences).
144
Statutory rape reform began in 1973 in Michigan when legislatures drafted and later
passed the Michigan Criminal Sexual Conduct Act, the first “victim-oriented and -initiated”
rape statute; Christina M. Tchen, Rape Reform and a Statutory Consent Defense, 74 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1518, 1537–38 (1983); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.520 (a)–(o)
(1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28–319 (1979); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:14–2 (1982).
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female. 145 Michael M., however, shifted the discourse from practical to political.
Initially, the argument that gender-neutral laws would extend the prosecutors’ reach
to underage male victims of sexual abuse persuaded state legislators of the need for
change.146 Few, if any, seemed concerned with formal equality arguments.
As the sexual revolution coincided with the women’s rights movement, genderneutrality seemed to take on a political tone. Lawmakers saw the political clout in
advocating for a law that treated both sexes as possible victims. 147 In adopting
gender-neutral legislation, lawmakers rejected both Supreme Court and state court
endorsements of gender-specific statutes and instead sought to demonstrate their
commitment to the formal equality school and the women’s equal rights movement
as a whole.148
Gender-neutral rape laws seemed an easy fix for those advocating formal
equality. By merely exchanging “male” for “person,” “female” for “minor” and even
“vagina” for “genital,” the language easily transformed into gender-neutral laws.149
By the late 2000s, every state in the country had removed the legislative
distinction between males and females for purposes of statutory rape.150
II. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SHIFT TO GENDER-NEUTRAL STATUTORY
RAPE LAWS
Apart from the political attractiveness of gender-neutral statutory rape laws,
they had practical advantages when considered from the prosecutors’ perspective.
Specifically, the laws allowed prosecutors to bring cases against three new
categories of defendants: (1) women who engaged in sex with males under the age
145

See, e.g., Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1977) (invalidating New
Hampshire’s rape law in part because males can be victims of the crime); People v. Yates,
637 N.Y.S.2d 101, 104 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (observing that New York courts have held
that males may experience trauma from sexual assault); State v. Stevens, 510 A.2d 1070,
1072 (Me. 1986) (noting that Maine’s rape law is gender-neutral “in light of the evil the
Legislature sought to remedy”).
146
See Cocca, supra note 125, at 65.
147
See Phillip N.S. Rumney, In Defense of Gender Neutrality Within Rape, 6 SEATTLE
J. SOC. JUST. 481, 483 (2007).
148
See infra Table A; Note, Feminist Legal Analysis and Sexual Autonomy: Using
Statutory Rape Laws as an Illustration, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1079 (1999); see also
Susannah Miller, The Overturning of Michael M.: Statutory Rape Law Becomes GenderNeutral in California, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 289, 294–95 (1995) (asserting that two cases
in which adult females seduced minor males served as the catalyst for California’s adoption
of gender-neutral statutory rape laws).
149
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (1991) (“Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act
of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the
female is under the age of 18 years.”) (emphasis added); cf. id. § 261.5(a) (2017) (“Unlawful
sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person who is not the
spouse of the perpetrator, if the person is a minor.”) (emphasis added).
150
Cocca, supra note 125, at 62; see also infra Table A (listing state statutes effective
as of 2017 or 2018).
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of consent; (2) males who engaged in sex with males under the age of consent; and
(3) same-sex teens.
The expanded definition of “perpetrator,” coupled with the increased rate at
which teens were having sex,151 opened a floodgate for new prosecutions. Census
bureau figures from 1995 estimated that there were at least 7.5 million identifiable
cases of statutory rape per year around the time the laws changed. Many of these
cases were instances of consensual sex. 152 Only certain types of cases, however,
went to trial: (1) cases involving pregnancy;153 (2) cases easily identifiable through
the local neighborhood sweeps, parental complaints or required health care
reporting; 154 and (3) cases concerning “significant age disparity or obvious
exploitation.”155
Broadening statutory rape laws to include both sexes expanded prosecutors’
reach to cases they had not previously been able to prosecute. The inherent problem
with gender-neutrality, however, as it relates to consensual sex between two minors,
is identifying neutrality (i.e., who is the victim and who is the perpetrator).
Prosecutors could easily label the perpetrator in instances involving pedophiles and
persons in a position of authority, such as schoolteachers.156 A problem arose with
respect to underage teens engaged in consensual sexual relations. In such instances,
some legislation gave prosecutors unlimited discretion in characterizing victim and
perpetrator although both parties engaged in the same unlawful behavior.157

151

Forty percent of high school students have had sexual intercourse. SEXUAL RISK
BEHAVIORS: HIV, STD, & TEEN PREGNANCY PREVENTION, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION (last updated, June 14, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/sexual
behaviors/ [https://perma.cc/SYR9-U6UA]; see also Laura Kann et al., Youth Risk Behavior
Surveillance—United States, 2013, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1 (June 13,
2014), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss6304.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2N2-ZBJZ].
152
Oberman, supra note 17, at 704 n.3 (“This estimate is admittedly low, taking into
account only the fifteen million U.S. residents who are between the ages of thirteen and
sixteen, and assuming that 50% of them have had intercourse once. Obviously, many young
people have intercourse earlier than age thirteen, and many more have intercourse more than
once. It is also worth noting that the definition of statutory rape varies across jurisdictions.
Thus, sexual intercourse between two minors is a crime in some, but not all, jurisdictions.”).
153
See Oberman, supra note 17, at 734.
154
Id. at 739.
155
See id. at 743.
156
Id. at 767.
157
See, e.g., Missouri v. Stokely, 842 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Mo. 1992) (upholding male
defendant’s conviction of rape after having consensual sex with 13-year-old girl as
prosecution was not discriminatory and the statute was not unconstitutionally vague); cf.
Russell Christopher & Kathryn Christopher, The Paradox of Statutory Rape, 87 IND. L.J.
505, 506–09 (2012) (discussing the case of Henyard v. State and noting while Ms. Lewis was
a victim of a “nightmarish rape” she also technically committed statutory rape as statutory
rape is a strict liability crime and defendant Small was 14-years-old); see also id. at 545–49
(discussing the pitfalls of prosecutorial discretion in the context of overbroad statutory rape
statutes).
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Based on a review of present laws, I propose that for prosecutorial purposes,
American statutory rape laws can be divided into two categories: (1) age-differential
prosecution, in which the legislation directs the prosecutor to bring charges against
the older of the two consenting minors; and (2) arbitrary prosecution, in which the
legislation is silent as to which party prosecutors should charge, allowing the
prosecution to charge either party for the same wrongful conduct. The former
provides some guidance on prosecutors bringing charges against those engaged in a
consensual prohibited sexual activity. The latter grants prosecutors an inappropriate
amount of discretion which, in practice, undermines the statute’s genderneutrality.158
A. Age-Differential Prosecution Jurisdictions
Age-differential prosecution statutes make it a crime to engage in sexual
intercourse with a minor who is a certain number of years younger than the
perpetrator.159 In Mississippi, the perpetrator is any consenting teen at least three
years older than the victim.160 Colorado law requires the perpetrator to be at least
four years older than the victim. 161 In Texas, the perpetrator has an affirmative
defense if he or she is no more than three years older than the victim and the victim
is at least fourteen.162 Thirty-four states have adopted age-differential provisions into
their statutory schemes.163 Statutory rape charges do not lie unless the perpetrator’s
age exceeds the victim’s by a statutorily-defined number of years.164

158

See infra Part IV.B.
Over thirty U.S. states have adopted “Romeo and Juliet” laws, which reserve the
harshest punishment for statutory rape to older adults. Romeo and Juliet laws provide an
affirmative defense, and in some jurisdictions a partial defense for a perpetrator of statutory
rape when both actors are below the legal age of consent, are of a certain age, and at least a
certain number of years apart in age. See Caitlyn Silhan, Comment, The Present Case Does
Involve Minors: An Overview of the Discriminatory Effects of Romeo and Juliet Provisions
and Sentencing Practices on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Youth, 20 L. &
SEXUALITY: REV. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER LEGAL ISSUES 97, 107 (2011).
Congress explicitly created “Romeo and Juliet” laws to serve as an exception to statutory
rape laws for youth who engage in sexual activities. See Lawrence G. Walters, How to Fix
the Sexting Problem: An Analysis of the Legal and Policy Considerations for Sexting
Legislation, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 98, 128–29 (2010) (“[The] ‘Romeo and Juliet’
exemption used by the federal child sex offender registry provides that the defendant may
seek removal from the sex offender list only if the defendant is no more than four years older
than the ‘victim’ of the offense.”).
160
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95 (2017).
161
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402 (2018).
162
TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (2017). That the actor was the spouse of the
child is also a defense. Id.
163
See infra Table A.
164
A problem still arises when the parties are less than the age-differential designated
in the statute.
159
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Age-differential prosecution statutes appear designed to deter the older partner,
who, legislatures presume, should have a greater understanding of the consequences
of sexual intercourse with a minor. But state-announced legislative intents suggest
that the laws are still designed to protect minors from bad choices and not necessarily
intended to form the basis for criminal charges against one of two consenting teens.
For example, Connecticut makes it a crime for a person to engage in sexual
intercourse with another person who is “13 years of age or older but under 16 years
of age, and the actor is more than two years older than such person.”165 When faced
with interpreting its state’s age-differential statute, the Connecticut Supreme Court
observed that the purpose of age-gap statutes is to protect victims under sixteen “who
do not have the full measure of maturity to make an intelligent choice regarding
sexual intercourse, from being taken advantage of by someone who, because he or
she is significantly older, may be able to persuade the victim to engage in physically
consensual intercourse.” 166 Consequently, the court upheld a male minor
defendant’s conviction even though he was just two years and three months older
than the victim, which the defendant had unsuccessfully argued made him two full
years older than the victim.167
B. Arbitrary Prosecution Jurisdictions
Arbitrary prosecution jurisdictions are problematic for many reasons. Genderneutral statutes that do not include age-differential provisions are wholly silent
concerning which party is the victim and which is the perpetrator, resulting in what
the Utah Supreme Court called “absurd results.”168 The court noted, the law has
yielded the unintended consequence of making a party to the consensual sexual
conduct both victim and perpetrator. 169 Accused perpetrators in arbitrary
prosecution statute jurisdictions have challenged these statutes with some frequency,
arguing that they grant prosecutors a constitutionally unreasonable amount of
discretion to choose whom to prosecute.170
Courts have reviewed these challenges with mixed results. The Supreme Court
of Vermont, reviewing the conviction of a fourteen-year-old boy who engaged in
“mutual consensual sex,” found its legislature could not have intended for its genderneutral statutory rape law to create the harsh and unreasonable results that it
yielded.171 Conviction under the statute demanded that the state label the fourteenyear-old defendant as a life-long child abuser. 172 Furthermore, according to the
165

Connecticut v. Jason B., 702 A.2d 895, 897 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997) (citing CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 53a-71 (1994) (alteration in original)).
166
Connecticut v. Jason B., 729 A.2d 760, 769 (Conn. 1999).
167
Id. at 777.
168
Utah ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206, 1208–09 (Utah 2007).
169
Id. at 1212.
170
See id.; see also In re G.T., 758 A.2d. 301, 309 (Vt. 2000); Jason B., 702 A.2d at
897.
171
In re G.T., 758 A.2d. at 305.
172
Id.
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state’s statute theory of the case, two people under the age of sixteen who engage in
consensual mutual acts with each other are both guilty of statutory rape. 173 The
legislature, according to the court, did not intend this result. 174 The State's
construction of 13 V.S.A. Section 3252(a)(3), the court held, involves a breadth of
prosecutorial discretion that raises serious concerns about whether the resulting
prosecutions are consistent with equal protection of the law.175 For these reasons, the
law was inapplicable to the defendant given his potential status as both perpetrator
and victim.
The Utah Supreme Court found that its state gender-neutral statutory rape laws
led to “absurd results” when prosecutors charged a thirteen-year-old girl with
sexually abusing a twelve-year-old male after the twelve-year-old’s mother found
the defendant and her partner engaged in “mutually welcome sexual intercourse.”176
The Utah Court ruled in much the same way as the Vermont Court did in In re G.T.
Under the language of the statute, the prosecutors could label the minor-defendant
as both perpetrator and victim, a consequence that, the court found, the legislature
had not intended.177 The Vermont and Utah courts both overturned the defendants’
convictions.178 According to each court, overturning the statutes was a legislative
prerogative.179 Several years after these decisions, both states amended their laws to
include an age-differential element.180
Arbitrary-prosecution jurisdictions grant prosecutors unfettered discretion to
decide who to designate an offender in a consensual statutory rape case.181 By failing
to provide any guidelines, arbitrary prosecution statutes yield illogical outcomes.
Minors, such as a thirteen-year-old girl, can be charged with a crime under a statute
that the legislature enacted to protect her. As the next Part of this Article establishes,
the legal authority to select whom to prosecute has failed to correct gendered
stereotypes that fueled the move from gender-specific to gender-neutral statutes.

173

Id.
Id.
175
Id. at 306.
176
Utah ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206, 1208 (Utah 2007).
177
Id.
178
In re G.T., 758 A.2d. at 309; Utah ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1208.
179
In re G.T., 758 A.2d. at 309 (“The legislature has the power to specifically address
the issue before us by amendment to the statute.”); see generally Utah ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d
1206 (Utah 2007) (emphasizing that their holding is based on the conclusion that the
legislature could not have possibly intended the present application of the law).
180
The Utah Legislature amended its sexual abuse statute in 2016 to include an age
differential. See 2016 Utah Laws 372. Vermont amended its law in 2006. See 2006 Vt. Acts
& Resolves 192.
181
See, e.g., Utah ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206, 1208 (Utah 2007) (reversing the
convictions of a 13-year-old girl and 12-year-old boy who engaged in consensual sex with
each other resulting in pregnancy, where both were charged and convicted of sexual abuse
of a child under UTAH CODE § 76-5-404.1).
174
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III. THE FACTS OF THE MATTER
While courts and scholars raise significant, legitimate concerns over the
justness of both age-differential and arbitrary prosecution statutes, one or the other
remains in effect in every state.182 Where instances of consensual sexual misconduct
are concerned, arbitrary prosecution statutes function as a powerful weapon in the
prosecutor’s arsenal. Courts recognize that charges brought against both underage
minors for the same violation of statutory rape crimes violates equal protection.183
Consequently, prosecutors must choose which party to charge. Arbitrary prosecution
statutes, therefore, grant prosecutors discretion as to which party to charge when two
persons are involved in the same criminal behavior.184 Given that more than 50% of
teens questioned report they have engaged in some sexual behavior and 43% have
experienced intercourse before graduating from high school, states could prosecute
an abundance of minors for statutory rape. 185 Police are not spending their time
searching for these children.186 And while there is not extensive data on statutory
rape, those data suggest that enforcement, more often than not, begins with a
complaint by an adult legally related to one of the minors who had consented to the
intercourse with another minor.187
In other words, parents are the most likely sources for alerting the authorities
about statutory rape arising out of teenage consensual sexual intercourse. For
heterosexual couples, the female’s parent is most often the complainant. 188
According to an ABA report, the female partner’s parent alert authorities in 70% of
reported statutory rape cases stemming from consensual sex.189 Case law supports
182

See infra Table A. Note some states have a combination of arbitrary and agedifferential prosecution statutes for different offenses.
183
See Utah ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1208; In re G.T., 758 A.2d. at 308; see also In re
D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ohio 2001), cert denied, 565 U.S. 1100 (2011) (“Application of
the statute . . . to a single party [where both parties engaged in same unlawful act] violates
the Equal Protection Clause’s mandate that persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike.”).
184
See, e.g., Utah ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1208.
185
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, SEXUAL RISK BEHAVIORS (2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/sexualbehaviors/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/SYR9U6UA]; JOYCE C. ABMA & GLADYS M. MARTINEZ, SEXUAL ACTIVITY AND CONTRACEPTIVE
USE AMONG TEENAGERS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011–2015, NATIONAL HEALTH
STATISTICS REPORTS, NO. 104 (2017).
186
See KARYL TROUP-LEASURE & HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
STATUTORY RAPE KNOWN TO LAW ENFORCEMENT (2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1
/ojjdp/208803.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5MC-JP5C]. The report acknowledges that most
statutory rapes go unreported and thus “the incidence of statutory rape in the United States
is relatively unknown.” Id. The findings that follow are based on an analysis of the

NIBRS master files containing reports from law enforcement agencies in 21 states
for the years 1996 through 2000.
187

See, e.g., Utah ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1208; see also In re G.T., 758 A.2d. at 308.
ELSTEIN & DAVIS, supra note 29, at 22.
189
Id.
188
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this finding.190 For example, in B.H. v. Commonwealth, Kentucky police arrested
fifteen-year-old defendant, Bill, after twelve-year-old Carol’s mother reported him
to the police. 191 The victim’s mother discovered nude photos on her daughter’s
phone and called the police and then successfully urged them to bring charges
against the boy.192
In 2005, the United States Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs
issued its report on Statutory Rape Known to Law Enforcement (DOJ Report).193
The report analyzed the FBI’s National Incident-Based Reporting System master
files for the years 1996–2000.194 According to the DOJ Report, females comprise
95% of all statutory rape victims.195 More than 99% of the perpetrators in these cases
are males. 196 Eighteen percent of these male offenders are under eighteen years
old. 197 Twenty-nine percent of the female victims reported that they were in a
relationship with the offender, and 62% said that they knew the offender.198 The data
yielded an interesting correlation between the age of the victim and the age of the
offender. Given that the age of majority in many states is between 17 and 18, almost
20% of these offenders could most likely fall into the category of victim.199 Under
such circumstances, it is the prosecutor that assigned them offender status.200
190

See, e.g., B.H. v. Commonwealth, 494 S.W.3d 467 (Ky. 2016); see also Ohio v.
Williams, 93 N.E.3d 449 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (stating that mother called the police after
learning from friends that her daughter had pressured but consensual sexual relations); In re
Marasol F., 2013 WL 5503192 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2013) (stating that father called police
after he learned that daughter had sex that she claimed was consensual); Gonzalez v. State,
2009 WL 311448 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2009) (stating that parent called police after
learning defendant had consensual sex with 16 year old daughter).
191
B.H., 494 S.W.3d at 468.
192
Id.
193
See TROUP-LEASURE & SNYDER, supra note 186, at 1. The report remains widely
cited and is the most comprehensive of its kind. See id.; see, e.g., Cynthia Godsoe, Recasting
Vagueness: The Case of Teen Sex Statutes, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173, n.6 (2017); Linda
L. Schlueter, 40th Anniversary of Roe v. Wade: Reflections Past, Present and Future, 40
OHIO N. U. L. REV. 105, n.1087 (2013).
194
See TROUP-LEASURE & SNYDER, supra note 186, at 1 (containing reports from 21
states).
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 2. In contrast, only 11% of forcible rape was classified as boyfriend and
girlfriend. See also HOWARD SNYDER, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS REPORTED
TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS, DEP’T OF
JUSTICE 4 (July 2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf [https://perma.cc/
GM94-K3RP] (females are six times more likely than males to be victims of a reported
sexual assault).
199
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 13-1405 (2018) (defining a minor as under 18
years of age); CAL. PENAL CODE, § 261.5 (2018) (defining unlawful sexual intercourse as
intercourse with a person under 18); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.50 (2018) (defining age
of consent as 17); MO. REV. STAT. § 566.034 (2017) (defining age of consent as 17).
200
See TROUP-LEASURE & SNYDER, supra note 186, at 1.
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In 2012, the Federal Bureau of Investigation produced a report that looked at
offenders by age, race, and ethnicity. 201 Seventy-five percent of statutory rape
prosecutions under sixteen were male, slightly less than the DOJ findings. 202
Seventy-six percent of the offenders were white, 23% were black, and 6% were
Asian-American/Native Alaskan.203 Of the approximately ten million males under
eighteen in 2000,204 only 23% identified as white, 32% identified as black or African
American, and 24% identified as Asian.205 This comparison strongly suggests that
authorities are alerted to potential statutory rape crimes by white males at a rate that
is disproportionate to the general population.
These statistics, coupled with reported case law and anecdotal stories, suggest
that parents, mostly white parents, initiate law enforcement involvement where
consensual teenage sex is concerned. One study indicates that parents were
responsible for alerting authorities to almost two-thirds of all reported statutory rape
cases.206 Parents often turn to the police when they discover their daughters have
engaged in or are engaging in sexual relationships as a way to stop, what these
parents perceive as, inappropriate behavior. 207 Those parents tend to come from
educated, middle-class or upper-class families. 208 As Richard Delgado writes, a
majority of these prosecutions stem from “good homes,” perhaps because families
of means are more comfortable involving the police’s enforcement power.209

201

The report identified groups as male, female, unknown, white, black, American
Indian/Alaskan Native and Asian Pacific Islander. FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING
PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENSE OFFENDERS, STATUTORY RAPE, SEND RACE
BY AGE, 2012 (2012) (breaking down all statutory rape offenses in 2012 by age, race, and
sex).
202
Id.; see TROUP-LEASURE & SNYDER, supra note 186, at 3.
203
FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM, supra note 201.
204
JULIE MEYER, AGE: 2000, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T
OF COMMERCE, 2 fig.2 (2000), https://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7NWK-C6KF].
205
Id. at 5 fig.4.
206
ELSTEIN & DAVIS, supra note 29, at 22.
207
In some instances, girls report common law rape after their parents find out they
have engaged in what is in their family forbidden sexual contact. Once alone, the teenager
admits to the prosecutor that she lied to her parents and that she never thought the lie would
go this far. See Cheryl A. Whitney, Non-Stranger, Non-Consensual Sexual Assaults:
Changing Legislation to Ensure that Acts Are Criminally Punished, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 417,
442–43 n.150 (1996).
208
See generally Gary W. Harper, Contextual Factors that Perpetuate Statutory Rape:
The Influence of Gender Roles, Sexual Socialization and Sociocultural Factors, 50 DEPAUL
L. REV. 897 (2001).
209
Michelle Oberman & Richard Delgado, Statutory Rape Laws: Does It Make Sense
to Enforce Them in an Increasingly Permissive Society, 82 A.B.A. J. 86, 87 (1996).
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Healthcare professionals also report cases of consensual statutory rape.210 Most
states have statutes requiring healthcare workers to report suspected incidents of
sexual intercourse, thereby increasing prosecutors’ ability to enforce statutory rape
laws.211 Some states limit reporting requirements to cases where the healthcare or
other government official believes there is child abuse. 212 Most states, however,
place a duty on the healthcare professional to report any sexual conduct by a minor,
even if consensual. 213 Studies suggest that the majority of sexual misconduct
incidents that healthcare officials report identify Caucasian females as the victim.214
On the one hand, this may be explained by racial and ethnic disparity in access to
healthcare. 215 Blacks, Latinos and other racial minorities tend to have fewer
interactions with health care providers than whites. 216 On the other hand, it also
suggests that the health care providers who tend to gather information about and
report sexual misconduct are providers who serve white girls. Whether other
providers fail to collect information or report about additional segments of the teen
population is unknown.
The facts are clear. Teens have consensual sex. Legal authorities learn of few
of these cases, but when they do, it is typically at the request of a parent or a health
official. Parents of Caucasian females comprise an overwhelming majority of police
complaints prosecution for consensual sexual misconduct.

210

See Nancy Findholt & Linda C. Robrecht, Legal and Ethical Considerations in
Research with Sexually Active Adolescents: The Requirement to Report Statutory Rape, 34
PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 259, 260 (2002), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/
journals/3425902.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WXR-EQ7Y] (discussing difficulties of conducting
social science research of teenage sexual activity when teenagers know they are engaged in
illegal sexual relationships and that researchers have a legally-imposed duty to report the
teenagers’ sexual activity); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. §
419B.010 (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-310 (2018).
211
See generally Abigail English & Catherine Teare, Statutory Rape Enforcement and
Child Abuse Reprint: Effects on Health Care Access for Adolescents, 50 DEPAUL L. REV.
827 (2001) (discussing reporting requirements in different states).
212
See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-3 (2018); see generally ASAPH GLOSSER ET
AL., STATUTORY RAPE: A GUIDE TO STATE LAWS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (2004),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/75531/report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QTB8-Y6SJ]
(listing states and reporting requirements).
213
See GLOSSER ET AL., supra note 212, at 11.
214
NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, NCHS DATA ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES (2012).
215
Id.
216
RYAN CROWLEY, AM. C. OF PHYSICIANS, RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN
HEALTH CARE 3 (2010), https://www.acponline.org/acp_policy/policies/racial_ethnic_dis
parities_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQ4P-Q7RM ] (“Minorities have less access to health
care than whites.”).
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IV. VICTIMIZATION OVER EQUALITY
Despite gender-neutral statutes, prosecutions for heterosexual consensual
sexual intercourse fall heavily on the male partner. Consequently, females, who have
made the same sexual decision, find themselves labeled the victim to the crime they
committed with their sexual partner. This unevenness creates a type of victimology
paradigm.
In 1995, Susannah Miller acknowledged the likelihood that gender-neutral
statutes failed (or were failing) to achieve equality among the sexes.217 Miller wrote,
“while these stereotypes may no longer be embedded in the letter of the law, it
remains to be seen whether such stereotypes will influence the enforcement of the
law.”218 To be sure, the first part of Ms. Miller’s statement rings true. Gender-neutral
statutory rape laws have achieved the pre-Michael M. agenda of expanding the
definition of wrongful sexual conduct with a minor to include predatory sex against
males. Michael M. remains an outlier in the pursuit of gender equality. Since
Michael M., courts and legislatures have embraced a formalist approach to statutory
rape laws.
The latter part of Ms. Miller’s prophecy is equally valid. Enforcement of
statutory rape laws in instances of consensual sexual intercourse remains largely
uneven. States press charges against significantly more males, and parents of
Caucasian females bring complaints at a higher rate than parents of color.219 The
current gender bias in prosecution is not much different from when these sections of
the laws were gender-specific.220 Parents continue to push for prosecution of males
who engage in consensual sex with their female daughters, harkening back to the
days when fathers treated their daughters as property whose value could be
diminished by sexual activity. 221 Female teens continue to be objectified and, in
many ways, limited in their sexual freedom.222 Gender-neutral statutory rape laws
have failed to achieve feminist objectives.
This next Part will demonstrate how prophetic Ms. Miller was. Both courts and
legislatures have achieved laudable goals in removing the sexual differential in
statutory rape laws. Enforcement of these laws, however, remains very much
informed by a sexual stereotype of female as victim.

217

Miller, supra note 148, at 297.
Id.
219
See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
220
See id.
221
See Cocca, supra note 125, at 63.
222
See, e.g., Suzannah Weiss, 5 Negative Effects of Objectifying Women, According to
Science, BUSTLE (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.bustle.com/p/5-negative-effects-ofobjectifying-women-according-to-science-2959186
[https://perma.cc/BZB9-5VUM]
(noting that, according to psychiatrist Dr. Susan Edelman and author of Be Your Own Brand
of Sexy, “[w]hen you’re objectified, you can start to confuse your value with your sexuality”).
218
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A. The Good News: Gendered Language in Statutory Rape Laws Is Obsolete
Beyond the federal and state legislative shift to gender-neutral statutes of all
kinds, courts, particularly the Supreme Court, have taken the lead in defining
equality between the sexes. In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., the Supreme Court
invalidated a workplace hiring policy against considering female applicants with
pre-school children.223 Following Phillips, the Court overturned a series of laws and
policies that treated women worse than men.224 Justice Brennan wrote that laws such
as the one before the Court in Califano v. Goldfarb, 225 which rested on the
assumption that wives were dependent on husbands’ salaries but that husbands did
not require the same support, were based “upon old notions and archaic and
overbroad generalizations.”226
Therefore, it was curious that four years after Califano, the Court upheld the
statute in Michael M. According to the Court, pure biology distinguished the
cases.227 States had a compelling governmental interest in enacting and enforcing
gender-specific statutory rape laws because of fertility; females needed protection
against unwanted pregnancies and states sought relief from having to support
mothers on welfare.228 Most states in considering the justification of their genderspecific statutes emphasized this rationale.
223

400 U.S. 542 (1971).
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (striking down a federal statute
that automatically granted male uniformed force members housing and other benefits but
required female members to prove “actual dependency” on their husbands); Corning Glass
Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) (holding that policy that pays female “day
inspectors” less than male “night inspectors” violates the Equal Pay Act); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (holding that gender distinction in Social Security Act
unconstitutional).
225
430 U.S. 199 (1977); see also Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) (holding
provision of unemployed-parent benefits exclusively to fathers unconstitutional); Frontiero,
411 U.S. at 690–91 (holding unconstitutional exclusion of married female officers in the
military from benefits automatically accorded married male officers); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971) (holding unconstitutional a probate-code preference for a father over a mother as
administrator of a deceased child’s estate).
226
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 211 (internal quotations omitted).
227
Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 464–65 (1981) (“Because
virtually all of the significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage
pregnancy fall on the young female, a legislature acts well within its authority when it elects
to punish only the participant who, by nature, suffers few of the consequences of his conduct.
It is hardly unreasonable for a legislature acting to protect minor females to exclude them
from punishment. Moreover, the risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deterrence
to young females. No similar natural sanctions deter males. A criminal sanction imposed
solely on males thus serves to roughly ‘equalize’ the deterrents on the sexes.”).
228
Douglas McNamara, Sexual Discrimination and Sexual Misconduct: Applying New
York’s Gender-Specific Sexual Misconduct Law to Consenting Minors, 14 TOURO L. REV.
479, 495 (1998) (“[S]statutory rape laws protect society from unwanted teenage
pregnancies.”).
224
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History reveals that Michael M. was an anomaly for the post-1970s Court.
During the 2016–2017 term, in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 229 the Court held
unconstitutional a gender-differentiated statute that assumed the female was the
more vested parent in a heterosexual relationship.230
In the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg directly rejects the reasoning of
Michael M.231 The statute at issue, she wrote, reflects the “once habitual, but now
untenable” assumption that an “unwed mother is the natural and sole guardian of a
nonmarital child.”232 The majority opinion represents a radical shift from Michael
M., in which Justice Rehnquist wrote, “[a]t the risk of stating the obvious,” the
mother and her child bear the “significant social, medical, and economic
consequences” of illegitimate pregnancies.233
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion makes plain that any gender stereotypes perpetuated
by gender-specific statutory rape laws should be rejected. Presumably, this would
apply to gender-specific statutory rape statutes if one were to come somehow before
the Court.234 Justice Ginsburg observed, “new insights and societal understandings
can reveal unjustified inequality . . . that once passed unnoticed and

229

137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2012). The statute made it easier for a U.S. citizen mother living
abroad to pass citizenship to a child born outside the United States as compared to a U.S.
citizen father. An unmarried father could not pass along his U.S. citizenship to his child
unless he lived in the United States for five years, at least two after the age of 14. Id. §
1401(g). An unmarried mother, however, could pass along her citizenship after living in the
United States for a single year. Id. § 1409(c); CHAPTER 3 – UNITED STATES CITIZENS AT
BIRTH (INA 301 AND 309), U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTML/PolicyManual-Volume12-PartH-Chapter3
.html [https://perma.cc/2K57-6CJB] (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). Defendant, whose father
was living abroad at the time the defendant was born, moved to the United States at the age
of 13, failing to qualify him for citizenship under § 309(c). Sessions, 137 S. Ct. at 1687
(2017).
231
Michael M., 450 U.S. at 467 (noting the demand for a strict scrutiny, a level greater
than the intermediate scrutiny, the Michael M. Court applied to the California gender-specific
rape law).
232
Sessions, 137 S. Ct. at 1691.
233
Michael M., 450 U.S. at 470. At the risk of stating the obvious, teenage pregnancies,
which have increased dramatically over the last two decades, have significant social,
medical, and economic consequences for both the mother and her child, and the State.
234
Sessions, 137 S. Ct. at 1678 n.13 (“Even if stereotypes frozen into legislation have
‘statistical support,’ our decisions reject measures that classify unnecessarily and
overbroadly by gender when more accurate and impartial lines can be drawn.” (citations
omitted)). The concept is highly unlikely since every state now has gender-neutral laws. The
Court, in striking down the decision, “leveled up,” meaning that the rule of equality was that
both fathers and mothers had to live in the U.S. for five years. As a result, while the law was
a victory for equality, it was a loss for the plaintiff. See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Ginsburg
and the Price of Equality, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2017).
230
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unchallenged.” 235 The government failed to produce an “exceedingly persuasive
justification” for the gender-specific law, so the Court struck it down.236
“Protectiveness has often muffled the sound of doors closing against
women, . . . cloak[ing] real prejudice.” 237 Gender-specific statutory rape laws
sprang from that protectiveness. Morales-Santana and the cases on which the Court
relies in reaching its conclusion, reject protectiveness that comes at the expense of
inequality, so much so that the Court was willing to “extend, rather than nullify” the
greater of the two residency requirements.238 Today, gendered “stereotypes [seem
less] embedded in the letter of the law.”239
B. The Bad News: Gender-Neutral Statutes Have Not Yielded Influenced
Enforcement
Gender-neutral statutory rape laws have not yielded gender-neutral
enforcement. The stereotypes lawmakers and feminists hoped to dismantle, remain
deeply embedded in the present day. Males still are 75% of those characterized as
statutory rape perpetrators, reinforcing the stereotype of male as the aggressor.240
Parents continue to use enforcement to regulate their daughters’ sexual
experiences. 241 And while girls realize their sexuality to a greater degree than when
the laws were gender-specific, 242 they remain encumbered by laws—
235

Sessions, 137 S. Ct. at 1690 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603

(2015)).
236

Court observers were nearly unanimous in characterizing Morales-Santana as a
victory for equality because it recognized that males and females should be treated equally
regardless of their ability to bear children, repudiating the stereotype upon which Michael
M. and similar cases rested. But the victory for equality it was, in fact a loss for the plaintiff.
The Court chose to extend the five-year residency requirement the law imposed on fathers
to unwed mothers. Some lower courts have also taken opportunities to advance a retreat from
gender stereotypes. E.g., Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie School Dist. # 204, 523 F.3d
668, 674 (7th Cir. 2008) (comparing the slogan a “woman’s place is in the home” to “blacks
have lower IQ than whites,” noting both have equally damaging psychological
consequences). In Albinger v. Harris, Justice Terry Trieweiler wrote, “gender discrimination
is a bad thing.” Albinger v. Harris, 48 P.3d 711, 722 (Mont. 2002) (Trieweiler, J. concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
237
BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 141 (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. ed.,
1963).
238
Sabrina Mariella, Leveling Up over Plenary Power: Remedying an Impermissible
Gender Classification in the Immigration and Nationality Act, B.U. L. REV. 219, 223 (2016).
239
Miller, supra note 148, at 297.
240
See supra note 202 and accompanying text. A significant minority of society still
believes a woman’s place is in the home, necessitating a need for care and protection. See
generally J. Herbie DiFonzo, How Marriage Became Optional: Cohabitation, Gender, and
the Emerging Functional Norms, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 521 (2011).
241
See supra notes 206–209 and accompanying text.
242
Oberman, Turning Girls into Women, supra note 135, at 21 (“[T]hose who are not
legally competent often are sexually active. The most challenging members of this category
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notwithstanding their gender-neutral language—that prohibit them from choosing at
what age they may enjoy intimate sexual relations and the age of those with whom
they can enjoy sexual intimacy. 243 Gender stereotypes continue to inform how
“many people still order their lives.”244
The uneven enforcement rate of gender-neutral statutory rape laws perpetuates
the historical stereotypes on which gender-specific statutory rape laws rested. They
were originally supposed to combat “the oppressive male initiative.”245 Today, the
prosecution rate of gender-neutral statutory rape laws is approximately ninety-five
males to one female.246 These numbers reflect the reality of uneven application of
gender-neutral laws. Enactment of gender-neutral laws has failed to abolish
paternalistic protection and sexual inequality.247
State adoption of gender-neutral rape laws yields an unfortunate backlash. The
uneven prosecution creates a reinforcement of the female teen as weak, as a victim,
or as parental property. This backlash of gender-neutral rape laws represents a return
to victimology as a consequence of reckoning. Daphne Merkin, writing for the New
York Times, describes this phenomenon in reference to a piece on the #MeToo
movement. 248 Merkin argues that the somewhat overly-broad definition of male
are teenage girls, over half of whom are sexually active.”).
243
See TROUP-LEASURE & SNYDER, supra note 186, at 1.
244
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2017) (“Overbroad
generalizations of that order, the Court has come to comprehend, have a constraining impact,
descriptive though they may be of the way many people still order their lives.”). A 2008
study out of the University of Ohio found that 41% of persons in the workplace “agree
(strongly or somewhat) that it’s better for all involved if ‘the man earns the money and the
woman takes care of the home and children.”’ DiFonzo, supra note 240, at 558. Forty percent
of the adult paid workforce still adhere to traditional gender roles. Id.
245
See Olsen, supra note 135, at 404.
246
See TROUP-LEASURE & SNYDER, supra note 186, at 1.
247
In 2016, Peggy Orenstein offered a comprehensive study of the sexual identity of
girls who, “were the real beneficiaries of the feminist movement.” Fresh Air: “Girls & Sex,”
NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php
?storyId=472211301 [https://perma.cc/P8MD-F8NA] (discussing PEGGY ORENSTEIN, GIRLS
& SEX: NAVIGATING THE COMPLICATED NEW LANDSCAPE (2016)). Orenstein asserts that
despite girls experiencing greater public power after the post-feminist movement (power to
speak up, achieve job equality), things have changed very little with respect to their private,
sexual, life. See id. (“[O]ne of the things research shows about college-age women and
college-age men is that women are more likely to use their partner’s pleasure as a yardstick
of their own satisfaction. So they’ll say he was satisfied, so I’m satisfied, whereas men are
more likely - not all men, but men are more likely to use their own satisfaction as a measure
of their satisfaction.”).
248
Daphne Merkin, Publicly We Say #MeToo. Privately We Have Misgivings, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/opinion/golden-globesmetoo.html [http://perma.cc/ML75-4SJD]. In October 2017, a social movement erupted out
of the unacceptable exercise by men of their power over female subordinates. The #MeToo
movement exposed the widespread prevalence of sexual harassment, sexual and sexual
violence that women experience in the workplace. The goal of the #MeToo movement is to
raise awareness of the prevalence of this type of predatory behavior by men and to rid the
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aggression has resulted in a “victimology paradigm for young women, in particular
in which they are perceived to be . . . as frail as Victorian Housewives.” 249
#MeToo and state adoption of gender-neutral statutory rape laws share the
phenomenon of progressive movements resulting in a return of females to the
“weaker” sex.250 #MeToo, which began as a vehicle for exposing sexual abusers, has
morphed into its current iteration of an advocacy group fighting political, legal, and
cultural change.251 Initiatives growing out of the #MeToo movement include a call
for legislation to penalize companies that tolerate sexual harassment, the creation of
a legal defense fund, and a drive to reach gender parity in the workplace.252 Like the
feminists of the 1970s and 1980s, the #MeToo movement seeks to achieve a fair
gender equilibrium.253
Those who supported the change to gender-neutrality and members of the
#MeToo movement start from a place of common purpose—gender equality. The
unfortunate consequences of gender-neutral statutory rape laws as applied to
perpetrators and victims stands as a cautionary tale to #MeToo, its sister group
work place of sexual harassment, abuse and violence. See Anna Codrea-Rado, #MeToo
Floods Social Media with Stories of Harassment and Assault, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/technology/metoo-twitter-facebook.html
[https://perma.cc/J8VZ-GXE8]; Jessica Bennett, The #MeToo Moment: When the Blinders
Come Off, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/us/themetoo-moment.html?mtrref=www.google.com [https://perma.cc/SY8B-6EYJ].
249
Merkin, supra note 248.
250
Id.; see also Bari Weiss, Aziz Ansaris Is Guilty. Of Not Being a Mind Reader, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/opinion/aziz-ansari-babesexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/V3XJ-W26M] (suggesting that the #MeToo
hashtag has been overly used and is becoming unempowering to women); Jia Tolentino, The
Rising Pressure of #MeToo Backlash, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-rising-pressure-of-the-metoobacklash [https://perma.cc/2WU9-V727].
251
Chris Snyder & Linette Lopez, Tarana Burke on why she created the #MeToo
movement – and where it’s headed, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 13, 2017), http://www.business
insider.com/how-the-metoo-movement-started-where-its-headed-tarana-burke-time-personof-year-women-2017-12 [https://perma.cc/HEM6-PNGG]; see also Megan Garber, Is this
the Next Step for the #MeToo Movement, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 2, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/01/beyond-metoo-can-times-upeffect-real-change/549482/ [https://perma.cc/ZZN7-99K7].
252
On January 1, 2018, in response to #MeToo, a collective of women in the acting and
cosmetics industry announced an initiative to confront workplace sexual abuse and
harassment. The movement, called #TimesUp, was started with $13 million dollars in seed
money. Cara Buckley, Powerful Hollywood Women Unveil Anti-Harassment Action Plan,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/movies/times-uphollywood-women-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/PKV5-9PQA].
253
Marsha Mercer, #MeToo Movement Fuels a 1970s Comeback: The ERA, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/metoomovement-fuels-a-1970s-comeback-the-era_us_5a9816cee4b062df100e868a [https://perma
.cc/V979-5RBL].
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#TimesUp, and future movements. There is a risk that current and future efforts will
not empower women but will instead brand them as victims. When the male-female
dynamic creates a victimization paradigm, it is unfortunate. When state legislation
facilitates such victimization, it fails society and our girls.
Carefully crafted legislation and a recognition of the potential consequences
that can result from even the best intended legislation can better assure parity among
the genders. This next section offers recommendations for legislative reform aimed
at curtailing the type of prosecutorial discretion that perpetuates negative female
stereotypes. Rewriting those state laws that still allow for arbitrary prosecution will
more effectively achieve the goals of feminists and Formal Equalitists who believed
neutralizing gendered language would lead to a more balanced citizenry.
V. REMOVING SEXUAL STEREOTYPES: A CALL TO ABOLISH ARBITRARY
PROSECUTION STATUTES
Abolishing arbitrary prosecution statutes and replacing them with agedifferential prosecution statutes would better serve to achieve the feminist goal of
equal treatment between genders. To be sure, statutory rape statutes are essential to
police sexual predators. But these laws also permit enforcement of consensual sex
between minors. In arbitrary prosecution states, the perpetrator is overwhelmingly
male, and the “victim” is overwhelmingly female. This selective enforcement
perpetuates stereotypes of males as aggressors and females as victims.
The switch to gender neutrality did little to alleviate the goals of feminists who
saw eliminating the female as the presumptive victim of statutory rape laws as one
avenue towards achieving societal equality. Members of the formal equality school
held that treating males and females equally for purposes of punishing consensual
statutory rape would de-stigmatize females and empower their sexuality.
Unfortunately, the open-ended prosecutorial discretion available under some
gender-neutral statutory rape laws, particularly in arbitrary prosecution jurisdictions,
has resulted in a retreat to the “daughters as property” era.254
There is no shortage of scholarship calling for the abandonment of statutory
rape laws, in part because of entirely unequal treatment. However, abolishing
statutory rape laws would eliminate the possibility of punishing pedophiles and other
sexual predators.255
254

See supra notes 168–186 and accompanying text.
See Oberman, Turning Girls into Women, supra note 135, at 33. The FBI reported
that almost 5,000 individuals over 16, a majority of whom were 20 years or older, committed
statutory rape in 2012. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEX
OFFENSE OFFENDERS, STATUTORY RAPE, SEX AND RACE BY AGE, 2012 (2012),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs/2012/table-pdfs/sex-offense-offenders-statutory-rape-sex-and-raceby-age-2012/view [https://perma.cc/8QSN-G5PS] (breaking down all statutory rape offenses
in 2012 by age, race, and sex). A 2013 comprehensive quantitative study reported that most
of those surveyed favored sanctions for statutory rape violations in instances where one party
to the sexual relations is an adult. See Erin B. Comartin, Poco D. Kernsmith & Roger M.
Kernsmith, Identifying Appropriate Sanctions for Youth Sexual Behavior: The Impact of Age,
255
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The retributive and deterrent values of punishing particular instances of
statutory rape, which permit the prosecution to punish sexual predators, adults in
inappropriate relations with minors, and the like, far outweigh the benefits of
eliminating the crime of statutory rape. The fact that at least 44% of today’s highschool students are enjoying intimate consensual intercourse demands some
flexibility in the application of statutory rape laws to consensual sex between
teens.256 Because gender-specific laws still allow prosecutors to arbitrarily punish
teens, the only logical solution to the problems that arise from selective prosecution
of statutory rape laws is for states to switch from arbitrary prosecution to agedifferential prosecution. The affirmative defense of a Romeo and Juliet law
moderately benefits the identified perpetrator.257
Abolishing arbitrary prosecution statutes will, to a greater degree than agedifferential statutes, abolish the discretion granted to prosecutors, as well as parents
via prosecutors, in selecting which of the two wrongdoers of a couple engaging in
statutory rape to punish.258 To be sure, abolishing all gender-neutral statutory rape
laws would abolish the issue of prosecutors having the option to choose which party
Gender, and Sexual Orientation, NEW CRIM. L. REV. 652, 653 (2014). “The public’s beliefs
about youth sexual behavior is in concert with the intended goals of the juvenile justice
system, in that the suggested sanctions are focused on rehabilitation for 15-year-olds.
However, the public is more supportive of severe sanctions for 18- and 22-year-olds, but also
suggest counseling and probation. The significance of these findings informs policymaking
in that they suggest a more balanced approach for sanctioning consensual sexual
relationships between youths.” Id.
256
MARY ANN LAMANNA & AGNES RIEDMANN, MARRIAGES, FAMILIES, AND
RELATIONSHIPS: MAKING CHOICES IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 113 (11th ed. 2010). Many states
have resolved the matter by adopting Romeo-and-Juliet laws. See Franklin, supra note 61, at
317–20. Romeo and Juliet laws acknowledge that minors of a certain age are likely to engage
in sexual intercourse. These laws, like age-differential prosecution statutes, predicate
responsibility on the age difference between the parties. Id. at 317. Unlike age-differential
prosecution statutes, however, Romeo-and-Juliet laws lessen punishment for consenting
minors who equally choose to engage in intercourse, not absolve them of culpability. See id.
at 322. Because punishment still attaches, Romeo-and-Juliet laws continue the stigmatizing
effect of unequal punishment for statutory rape. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 943.04354 (2016);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/11-1.50 (2011); see also Franklin, supra note 61, at 317–18.
(“Shakespeare’s tale of two young lovers torn apart because of a long-standing feud between
their families is the ‘ultimate tale of young love.’ As the story goes, Romeo and Juliet were
two teenagers madly in love who were forced to choose between their love and the family
ties that kept them separate. Modern day may present yet another obstacle to their love since
Juliet, only thirteen, would be unable to consent to sexual conduct with her love, Romeo, an
older teen.”).
257
See supra note 118.
258
Selection can reinforce stereotypes. See Marsha R. Greenfield, Protecting Lolita:
Statutory Rape Laws in Feminist Perspective, 1 WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 1–2 (1976). With a rising
number of youthful female offenders, removing arbitrary prosecution statutes will
necessarily result in a more equal, or at least more representational reflection of females as
victims and offenders. Equal treatment of females under statutory rape laws will, therefore,
better achieve the goal of removing the “female as victim” stereotype.
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to prosecute in instances where both minor parties freely chose to engage in sexual
relations. Abolishment of the gender-neutral crimes would provide the benefit of
remedying the reinforced stereotypes selective enforcement of these crimes has
perpetuated. However, complete abolishment of the crime would eliminate the
State’s ability to prosecute “sick cases” such as pedophiles and adult perpetrators.259
Legislators are unlikely to eliminate statutory rape laws from their penal codes.
These laws can exist, however, in a way, that better furthers the political spirit in
which legislators adopted them. Arbitrary prosecution jurisdictions would be well
advised to amend their statutes and to model them after age-differential laws of their
sister states. In so doing, all states will strike a more even balance between allowing
prosecution for “sick cases” and promoting equality among genders.
To the extent that abolishing arbitrary prosecution statutes will result in equal
prosecution of males and females, underage females will have to take responsibility
of the standards set for males in Michael M. Girls, as well as boys, will have to weigh
whether engaging in sex is worth the risk of prosecution.260 Assigning this costbenefit responsibility to girls further confirms their power to make their own
sexuality decisions. For that reason, abolishing arbitrary prosecution is a salutary
move.
CONCLUSION
Despite the move to gender-neutral statutory rape laws, states continue to
enforce consensual sexual intercourse between teenagers in much the same way as
they did when the laws were gender-specific. Males face charges at a significantly
higher rate than females; males are more likely to be cast as the perpetrators; females
are more likely to be cast as the victims.261 The move to gender-neutral statutory
rape laws did little to remedy sexual stereotypes in arbitrary prosecution
jurisdictions.
The benefits of including statutory rape laws in criminal codes far outweighs
the burden. It would be unreasonable to remove such laws from state penal codes.
But, with respect to consensual sexual relations between teenagers, enforcement
perpetuates unwanted sexual stereotypes. The same can be said of the #MeToo
movement. The collective voices are dampened by an undercurrent of critics
whispering, “[y]ou must have been weak in the boardroom, the classroom, the
soundstage.”
To be clear, women are victimized, and both solidarity and gender neutrality
are for the good. But when the law, as practiced, does not work well, it fails women
and the movements that fight for their equality. Prosecution for consensual sexual
relations among teens should be rare and should be subject to the bright line test of
259

See Oberman, supra note 17, at 743–44.
Conversely, given the societal norms of equal responsibility in parenting, boys will
have to consider the consequences of consensual teenage sex, including unintended
pregnancies.
261
See supra Part III.
260
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age-differential prosecution statutes. Only in this way will the law truly embrace
formal equality, a long sought after, but still elusive goal.
TABLE A
Statutory Rape Laws by Jurisdiction262
State

Arbitrary
Age Differential Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho

X263
X265
X267
X268

262

X272
X275
X276

X264
X266
X269
X270
X271
X273
X274
X277
X278

Citations are to elements of the crime and do not include any affirmative defenses
available to the defendant.
263
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61 (2018) (Rape; first degree).
264
Id. § 13A-6-62 (Rape; second degree).
265
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.434 (2018) (Sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree).
266
Id. § 11.41.436 (Sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree).
267
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405 (2018) (Sexual conduct with a minor;
classification).
268
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (2018) (Rape).
269
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 2018) (Unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor);
see also id. § 261.5(b), (c) (providing for prosecution of defendant in instances where
defendant is three or more years older than the victim or three or more years younger than
the defendant.).
270
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402 (2018) (Sexual assault).
271
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-70(a)(2) (2018) (Sexual assault in the first degree: Class B
or A felony).
272
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 770(a)(1) (2018) (Rape in the fourth degree; class C
felony).
273
Id. § 770(a)(2).
274
FLA. STAT. § 794.05 (2018) (Unlawful sexual activity with certain minors).
275
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3 (2018) (Statutory rape).
276
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-730(b) (2018) (Sexual assault in the first degree).
277
Id. § 707-730(c).
278
IDAHO CODE § 18-6101 (2018) (Rape defined).
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Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire

279

280

X

X284
X287
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X279
X281
X282
X283
X285
X286
X288
X289

X290
X291
293

X
X294
X298

X292
X295
X296
X297
X299

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.50 (2018) (Criminal sexual abuse).
IND. CODE § 35-42-4-3 (2018) (Child molesting).
281
Id. § 35-42-4-9 (Sexual misconduct with a minor).
282
IOWA CODE § 709.4 (2018) (Sexual abuse in the third degree).
283
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503 (2018) (Rape).
284
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.110(1)(b)(2) (West 2018) (Sexual abuse in the first
degree).
285
Id. § 510.110(1)(c)(1).
286
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:80 (2018) (Felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile).
287
ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 253(1)(B) (2018) (Gross sexual assault).
288
Id. § 253(1)(A).
289
MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 3-304 (West 2017) (Rape in the second degree); see
also id. § 3-307 (Sexual offense in the third degree).
290
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 23 (2018) (Rape and abuse of child).
291
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b (2018) (Criminal sexual conduct in the first degree).
292
MINN. STAT. § 609.342 (2018) (Criminal sexual conduct in the first degree).
293
MISS. CODE ANN. 97-3-95 (2018) (Sexual battery).
294
MO. REV. STAT. § 566.032 (2018) (Statutory rape and attempt to commit, first
degree, penalties).
295
Id. § 566.034 (Statutory rape, second degree, penalty).
296
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502 (2018) (Sexual assault); see also id. § 45-5501(1)(a)(ii)(D) (stating that a victim is incapable of consent if under the age of 16). But see
id. § 45-5-502(3) (describing mandatory prosecution if victim is less than 16 years old and
if offender inflicts bodily harm).
297
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319 (2018) (Sexual assault; first degree; penalty).
298
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.366 (2018) (Sexual assault: Definition; penalties;
exclusions).
299
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:3 (2018) (Felonious Sexual Assault).
280
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New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
300

X300
X302
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X301
X303
X304

X305
X308

X306
X307
X309
X310
X311
X312
X313

X314
X315
X316
X317
X318
X319

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2018) (Sexual assault).
Id. § 2C:14-2(b).
302
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (2018) (Criminal sexual penetration).
303
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25 (McKinney 2018) (Rape in the third degree).
304
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.24 (2018) (First-degree statutory rape).
305
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03 (2018) (Gross sexual imposition - Penalty).
306
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.04 (West 2018) (Unlawful sexual conduct with
minor).
307
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1114 (2018) (Rape or rape by instrumentation in first
degree—Rape in second degree).
308
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.355 (2018) (Rape in the third degree); Id § 163.365 (Rape in
the second degree); Id. § 163.375 (Rape in the first degree).
309
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3122.1 (2018) (Statutory sexual assault).
310
11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-6 (2018) (Third degree sexual assault).
311
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (2018) (Criminal sexual conduct with a minor;
aggravating and mitigating circumstances; penalties; repeat offenders).
312
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-1 (2018) (Rape--Degrees--Felony--Statute of
limitations).
313
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-506 (2018) (Mitigated statutory rape -- Statutory rape -Aggravated statutory rape).
314
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (West 2018) (Sexual Assault).
315
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-401.1 (West 2018) (Sexual abuse of a minor).
316
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (2018) (Sexual Assault)
317
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-63 (2018) (Carnal knowledge of a child between thirteen and
fifteen years of age).
318
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.073 (2018) (Rape of a child in the first degree).
319
W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-5 (2018) (Sexual assault in the third degree).
301
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Wisconsin
Wyoming
Federal
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X320
X321
X322

WIS. STAT. § 948.02 (2018) (Sexual assault of a child).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303 (2018) (Sexual assault in the second degree).
322
18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2018) (Sexual abuse of a minor or ward).
321
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